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DOCTORAL DISSERTATION  
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Abstract 
Fahsing, I.A. (2016). The Making of an Expert Detective: Thinking and Deciding in 
Criminal Investigations. Department of Psychology, University of Gothenburg, Sweden. 
 
Drawing on theoretical frameworks developed in social and cognitive psychology, this thesis 
examines the degree to which individual and systemic factors may compensate for inherent biases 
in criminal detectives’ judgments and decision-making.  Study I – an interview study – explored 
criminal detectives’ views of critical factors related to decision making in homicide investigations. 
Experienced homicide investigators in Norway (n = 15) and the UK (n = 20) were asked to 
identify decisional ‘tipping point’– decisions that could change detectives’ mind-set from suspect 
identification to suspect verification together with situational and individual factors relating to 
these decisions. In a content analysis, two types of decision were identified as typical and 
potentially critical tipping-points: (1) decisions to point-out, arrest, or charge a suspect, and (2) 
decisions concerning main strategies and lines of inquiry in the case. Moreover, 10 individual 
factors (e.g. experience) and 14 situational factors (e.g. who is the victim) were reported as related 
to the likelihood of mind-set shifts, most of which correspond well with previous decision-
making research. Study II, using a quasi-experimental design, compared the quality of 
investigative decisions made by experienced detectives and novice police officers in two countries 
with markedly different models for the development of investigative expertise (England and 
Norway). In England, accredited homicide detectives vastly outperformed novice police officers 
in the number of adequate investigative hypotheses and actions reported. In Norway, however, 
bachelor educated police novices did marginally better than highly experienced homicide 
detectives. Adopting a similar design and the same stimulus material, Study III asked if a general 
test of cognitive abilities used in the selection process at the Norwegian Police University College 
could predict police students’ ability to generate investigative hypotheses. The findings did not 
support such a notion and this is somewhat in line with the available knowledge in the area 
showing that cognitive ability tests have low predictability for applied reasoning tasks. Taken 
together, this thesis suggests that investigative judgments are highly susceptible to the individual 
characteristics and biases of the detective. The results indicate that detective-expertise might act 
as a viable safeguard against biased decision-making, but length of experience alone does not 
predict sound judgments or decisions in critical stages of criminal investigations. Education and 
training is a solid foundation for the making of an expert detective. Nevertheless all participants’ 
researched across the two experiments were biased towards crime and guilt assumptive 
hypotheses. Hence, true abductive reasoning (i.e. to identify all competing explanations) and the 
presumption of innocence is hard to operationalise even for expert detectives with extensive 
training. 
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Svensk sammanfattning (Swedish summary): 
 
Syftet med föreliggande avhandling är att utifrån socialpsykologiska och 
kognitiva teorier undersöka i vilken grad individuella faktorer hos 
brottsutredaren och systemiska skillnader i utvecklandet av utredares 
kompetens påverkar vanliga bedömnings- och beslutsfel under utredningar 
av grov kriminalitet. Genom djupintervjuer undersökte Studie 1 vad erfarna 
brottsutredare menar är de mest kritiska ”tipping points” i en 
mordutredning (dvs. beslut som gör att utredarens fokus skiftas från 
undersökande till bekräftande), och vilka faktorer som kan påverka dessa 
bedömningar. Brottsutredare från England (N = 20) och Norge (N = 15) 
med lång erfarenhet av brottsutredning beskrev hur beslut som fattas under 
komplexa utredningar kan tänkas ändra utredarnas tankesätt från 
undersökande till bekräftande, samt vilka individ- eller situationsfaktorer 
som kan påverka denna psykologiska process. Två karaktäristiska beslut 
nämndes av samtliga deltagare: (1) beslut kopplade till utpekning, anhållande 
och häktning av en misstänkt och (2) beslut angående vilka som är de mest 
centrala hypoteserna och stegen i utredningsprocessen av ett fall. Tio 
individuella (t.ex. utredningserfarenhet) och 14 situationsbundna (t.ex. 
tidspress) faktorer identifierades som samverkande med förändringar i 
tankesätt. De flesta faktorerna korresponderade med tidigare 
beslutsfattandeforskning. Studie II undersökte engelska och norska polisers 
förmågor att identifiera nödvändiga hypoteser och utredningssteg i en 
brottsutredning, samt hur robusta förmågorna var mot en potentiell ”tipping 
point” som identifierats i Studie I (beslut om anhållande). Det finns 
betydliga skillnader i systemen för utveckling av kompetens mellan den 
norska och engelska polisen. Därför jämfördes nyutbildade poliser och 
erfarna mordutredare från de två länderna i en vinjettbaserad studie med 
utredningsärenden inspirerade av verkliga rättsfall. De erfarna engelska 
utredningsledarna presterade klart bättre än de övriga tre grupperna, medan 
nyutbildade norska poliser med kandidatexamen presterade något bättre än 
erfarna norska mordutredare. Med utgångspunkt i forskningsdesignen och 
materialet utvecklade för Studie II, undersökte Studie III i vilken grad 
prestationen på ett test av generell kognitiv förmåga som utförs i samband 
med antagningen på Polishögskolan i Norge kan predicera polisstudenternas 
förmåga att identifiera relevanta utredningshypoteser. Resultaten gav inte 
stöd åt ett sådant samband, vilket delvis är i linje med den begränsade  
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tidigare forskningen i området. Sammantaget indikerar studierna att vissa 
individuella skillnader mellan poliser i betydlig grad kan påverka deras 
beslutsförmågor i centrala delar av en brottsutredning. Expertis i 
brottsutredning kan utgöra en viktig skyddsfaktor mot fällor i 
beslutsfattandet, men endast om expertisen utvecklas, dokumenteras och 
tillämpas i ett system som inte uteslutande bygger på lång praktisk 
erfarenhet. Lång utredningserfarenhet kommer alltså inte i sig självt att göra 
poliser till experter, medan utbildning utgör ett fundament för utveckling av 
utredningsexpertis. Samtidigt visade alla deltagargrupper i Studie II och III 
en klar tendens att favorisera hypoteser som innebar att brott hade begåtts 
(jämfört med icke-kriminella hypoteser, som olycksfall, sjukdom, frivilligt 
avvikande, etc.). I linje med tidigare forskning på området visar alltså 
avhandlingen på svårigheten att tänka abduktivt och därmed upprätthålla 
oskuldspresumtionen (dvs. ”oskyldig till bevisat skyldig”) – även för 
utredare med lång erfarenhet och utbildning
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		 1 
A MODERN-DAY WITCH-HUNT? 
 
In September 2008, close to the village of Loftahammar in Sweden, Ingemar Westlund 
(68) found the body of his wife Agneta (63) by a lake. He claimed he had last seen her 
alive a couple of hours before when she took the family dog out for a walk in the forest. He 
had just finished his weekly lawn mowing with his tractor. When she failed to return he 
went out to look for her. He immediately called the police and due to the nature of the 
injuries on her body a murder investigation commenced. Mr. Westlund told the police that 
he heard what seemed like a big splash from the lake just before he found her. Animal 
hairs which did not belong to her dog, were found on her jacket. They were not subjected to 
further analysis. Instead, based on a number of linear cuts containing fragments of grass on 
the deceased’s chest the police hypothesised that she was injured and asphyxiated by some 
mechanical cutting device such as a heavy lawnmower. Though no forensic evidence such as 
blood, hair or DNA, was found on Mr. Westlund’s lawn mower, and even though he had 
no motive or other irregularity in his statement, he was arrested on suspicion of murdering 
his wife. He was held in police custody for ten days and under formal suspicion for five 
months. In the interviews, he denied killing his wife and stuck to his initial statement. The 
police held several case reconstructions with the tractor lawnmower but never succeeded in 
getting on top of something that came close to the size of a human body. The case remained 
status quo for more than a year. At that time, however, the local gossip and unrest 
following the incident had made Mr. Westlund flee the village he had lived in all his life. A 
year and a half after the arrest, a forensic analyst at the National Forensic Centre found a 
clip on the Internet of a moose attacking a woman outside a shopping market in Alaska. 
He then engaged an elk specialist and together they found large amounts of elk saliva on 
the deceased’s jacket. The local police never informed the husband or the media about the 
elk theory. Later on, some prints from a pair of sample elk hoofs were paired with the 
injuries on the deceased. The comparison showed a near perfect match. Finally, at a press 
conference the case against Mr. Westlund was dropped. A local journalist later informed 
him about the decision. The police and prosecution service never apologized for what had 
happened and claimed they did nothing wrong. Mr. Westlund remarked: “My life is 
ruined. I have been dragged through a nightmare – a modern-day witch-hunt beyond my 
wildest imagination.” 
 
		 2 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In hindsight, the investigative decision-making in the story above seems both 
incompetent and miserable. What probably makes Mr. Westlund’s nightmare 
even worse is the fact that the police and the prosecution service refuse to 
apologize and still hold they did nothing wrong and “acted by the book” 
(Nielsen, 2013). The story illustrates how crucial hypotheses and evidence 
might be overlooked when the police investigate with seemingly no 
safeguards for cognitive errors, with tragic consequences for those involved 
– even without a wrongful conviction. The defensive response from the 
Swedish police and prosecution service in the case suggests a worrying 
ignorance of available knowledge, learning and development. Unfortunately, 
this case of serious investigative failure is far from unique in Scandinavia (eg., 
Gudjonsson, 2003; Justitiedepartementet, 2015; Justitiekanslern, 2006; 
Rachlew, 2009), Europe (e.g., De Poot, Bokhorst, van Koppen, & Muller, 
2004; Macpherson, 1999; Ritzer & Przybilla, 2013; van Koppen, 2008) or the 
rest of the world (e.g., Huff, Rattner, & Sagarin, 1996; Innocence Project 
2010; Kassin, Dror, & Kukucka, 2013; Rattner, 1988; Scheck, Neufeld, & 
Dwyer, 2000).  
Mistakes in detectives’ decision-making are likely the most common 
type of error in criminal investigations (e.g., Carson, 2013; Irvine & 
Dunningham, 1993; Kassin et al., 2013; Rachlew, 2009; Simon, 2012a). 
Problems typically arise when the police early and prematurely shift from 
evidence-based investigation to suspect-driven case building, without 
considering competing explanations or collecting all the available evidence 
(Rossmo, 2009; Stelfox & Pease, 2005; van Koppen, 2008). Research on 
detectives’ decision making is relatively scarce but suggests that serious 
investigative failures may have been avoided if the available knowledge had 
been applied in a more systematic way (Ask & Alison, 2010; Jones, Grieve, & 
Milne, 2008; Riksadvokaten, 2015; Rossmo, 2014; Stelfox & Pease, 2005; 
Westera, Kebbell, Milne, & Green, 2014b). So far, very few countries have 
acknowledged the need for a policy enforcing the development of systemic 
countermeasures against investigative errors at the individual and 
organisational level (Granhag, Strömwall, & Cancino Montecinos, 2013; 
McGrory & Treacy, 2012). Despite the fact that complex criminal 
investigation differs hugely from other parts of police work (Innes, 2007; 
Stelfox, 2007), the vast majority of the European police forces still recruit 
and train officers based on the traditional notion of the omnipotent police 
		 3 
generalist, as opposed to the highly specialized expert detective (Dean & 
Gottschalk, 2007).  
There is little research on what makes a good detective and few formal 
systems in place to translate knowledge into sound investigative practice and 
acknowledge detective expertise (De Poot et al., 2004; Fahsing, 2013; Hald, 
2011; Tong, Bryant, & Horvath, 2009). Due to the lack of formal systems for 
recruitment and authorization, the level of expertise is often synonymous 
with years of professional experience (Jacob & Ebrahimpur, 2001). England 
and Wales, however, have turned their experiences from justice failures into 
reforms with programmes specifically directed towards standardization of 
core investigative methods, procedures, and accreditation of police 
investigators (ACPO, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2010, 2012). An initiative under the 
British Police Reform Act 2002 was the Professionalizing the Investigative 
Process (PIP) programme, which was formally launched by the Association 
of Chief Police Officers in 2005. The aim of PIP was “to enhance the crime 
investigation skills and ability of police officers and staff involved in the 
investigative process and to drive through new standards of investigation at 
all levels” (NCPE, 2005, p. 1). This was to be achieved by providing training 
in and assessment of professional investigative procedures designed to assist 
investigators in making accountable decisions and minimizing the risk of 
errors.  
The scope of this thesis is to compare the investigative decision-making 
of police officers in England and Wales, where a policy shift has been 
implemented, with their counterparts in Norway, where no comparable shift 
has taken place (Politidirektoratet, 2013). More specifically, the aims are to 
explore variations in knowledge and awareness of judgment and decision-
making processes among highly experienced Norwegian and British 
homicide detectives (Study I). Next, to examine the degree to which cross-
national differences in policy, education systems, and professional standards 
might influence police officers’ judgements and decision-making in complex 
criminal investigations (Study II). Finally, since recruitment of the best 
candidates is vital in any profession, the thesis examines the degree to which 
a test of general cognitive aptitude, used in the selection process by the 
Norwegian police, can predict the ability to engage in diagnostic reasoning in 
investigative settings (Study III).  
		 4 
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 
 
In the 1820’s, the founder of modern-day policing Sir Robert Peel described 
the detection of offenders as one of the fundamental functions of the police 
(Morris, 2007). This has remained unchanged in the United Kingdom and 
has later become the model for most countries around the world (Kurian, 
1989). Criminal investigation is therefore one of the key strategic functions 
of the police service and its quality is vital for the legitimacy of the police 
(Maguire, 2008). The function occurs at every level of policing, from the 
investigation of pick pocketing in village markets to high-stake international 
counter-terrorism operations (Stelfox, 2008).  
The main purpose of a criminal investigation is to establish if, how, 
where, when, why, and by whom a crime was, or will be, committed (Cook & 
Tattersall, 2014; Greenwood, Chaiken, & Petersilia, 1977; Gross, 1893). To 
do this, detectives must discover, collect, check and consider clues from 
various sources of information and try to construct a coherent account of 
the event (Dean, Fahsing, Glomseth, & Gottschalk, 2008; Innes, 2003). In 
some cases this is rather straightforward, but in others the challenge is 
considerable (De Poot et al., 2004; Stelfox, 2009). According to Stelfox 
(2008) there are three main reasons for this: (1) The volume, type and 
distribution of case-relevant information that is generated in different 
criminal offences will vary greatly. This variation in the information profiles 
from case to case makes the task unpredictable. For example, the material 
generated by a car accident will be very different from that generated by the 
sexual abuse of a child or by an attempted Internet fraud. These variations 
can be large even within a single crime type and investigators need to be able 
to make good decisions about what type of crime they are up against, what 
information may have been generated and how to best locate it. (2) The 
difficulty investigators experience in locating and securing case-relevant 
information is contingent on their knowledge of relevant information 
sources and the nature of potential traces. This knowledge will vary from 
being highly technical (i.e. cell-phones, DNA) to psychological (interviews 
with offenders, victims and witnesses). For example, skilled offenders may be 
able to control the availability of information by cleaning crime scenes, 
disposing of incriminating material or by intimidating potential witnesses. 
They can also control information through the choices they make in the 
event of being interviewed as a suspect. Victims and witnesses who are not 
motivated to provide information can often avoid contact with the police 
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altogether or can provide partial or false testimony. For these reasons, 
information is not always freely available to investigators, and so they must 
be skilled in a range of techniques in order to pursue, locate and recover it. 
(3) Investigative opportunities are at their greatest and more easily exploited 
during the early stages of an investigation. Physical material can degrade 
rapidly for environmental reasons, and memories can become less reliable for 
psychological reasons. Moreover, recorded data, such as CCTV or financial 
information can be disposed of or overwritten. This makes it important that 
such material is recovered as quickly as possible. Other factors are of course 
relevant but the key to success lies in the detective’s ability to make effective 
decisions about what kind of crime he or she may be up against, what kind 
of case-relevant material that may have been generated and how to best 
identify and secure it whilst it is still available to the investigation.  
 Criminal homicide is considered the capital crime and the investigation 
of murder is often seen as the ultimate challenge for detectives (Brookman & 
Innes, 2013). As stated in UK by Her Majesty’s Inspector of the 
Constabulary (2000): “the investigation of murder should set clear standards 
of excellence that all other criminal investigation can follow” (p. 115). 
According to Innes (2003), the investigation of murder is bestowed so much 
prestige that the public view it as an index of police competence overall. In 
response to particularly violent and consequential crimes, people demand 
that perpetrators are promptly captured and brought to justice, and failure to 
do so may trigger severe criticism (Bayley, 1994; Greenwood et al., 1977). 
For the very same reasons the investigation of potential homicide is the 
scope of the present thesis. 
 
Dirty Harry and Expedient Case Construction 
The detection and prosecution of serious crime has always attracted a vast 
amount of public attention. Daily reports of high profile cases in the media 
and portrayals of fictional detectives, such as Sherlock Holmes, Lt. Colombo 
and Inspector Morse, have only worked to heighten this interest (Carson, 
2009). The discrepancy between these fictitious masterminds and real 
detectives appear to be massive (Tong & Bowling, 2006). Despite the 
importance of the detective task and the hugely popular interest in criminal 
cases, the potential explanations for this discrepancy have not received much 
attention in research or in police practice (O’Neill & Milne, 2014).  
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Although there are some important studies available (e.g., Smith & 
Flanagan, 2000; Nilsen, 2012; Westera, Kebbell, Milne, & Green, 2014a), the 
vast majority of research in this field is still descriptive and does not have a 
“what works” perspective (Ask, 2013; Bradley & Nixon, 2009; Sherman, 
2015). Obvious questions like what characterizes an optimal investigative 
procedure, or what individual qualities are required of an expert detective 
have not been systematically examined (O’Neill & Milne, 2014). There are 
probably many reasons for this. First of all, there is no tradition of research 
within the police service and many police officers are reluctant to engage 
with external researchers (Fahsing, 2013; Stelfox & Pease, 2005). This has 
resulted in what is referred to as a dialogue of the deaf  – meaning that both 
sides talk, but neither side seems to listen (Bradley & Nixon, 2009; Punch, 
2010). Second, the research-questions linked to detectives’ decision-making 
are quite complex and hard to operationalise in scientific experiments. 
Similarly, the research output might be challenging to grasp and utilize for 
the practitioners (Canter & Zukauskiene, 2007; Morgan, 1990). Moreover, all 
criminal cases are protected by legal confidentiality. This fact sets legal and 
ethical constraints on the research, but might also serve as a comfortable 
excuse for the police against unwanted scrutiny (Reiner, 2010).  
Criminal investigation is a highly regulated undertaking and every step 
should be documented and transparent. Law defines its commencement, 
undertakings, and purpose (Morris, 2007). However, sociological and 
criminological studies indicate that traditional detective work did not always 
thrive in “the light of day” (Leo, 2008; Maguire, 1994, 2003; Reiner, 1997). A 
central characteristic of the job is the pressure to constantly perform. As 
pointed out by Maguire (1994): “Despite the changes in recent years, the 
CID1 clearly remains highly results-oriented: what matters, above all else, the 
very rasion d’être of the detective branch, is to arrest criminals” (p. 44). 
Becoming a detective was in itself a promotion that kept you away from the 
uniform and the streets—but only if you blended in and performed (Rachlin, 
1995). As stated by one of Maguire’s (1994) detective interviewees: “A 
sus[pect] a day keeps the helmet away” (p.44). Furthermore, the environment 
in which homicide detectives operate involves daily exposure to grave 
violence, appalling abuse, and hardnosed suspects, all of which may 
encourage goal-directed thinking (Ask, Granhag, & Rebelius, 2011) and 
emotional involvement (Ask & Granhag, 2007a; Hobbs, 1988). Moreover, 
major crime enquiries are burdened with high workload, time-pressure, and 																																																								
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constant media attention (Innes, 2003; Tong & Bowling, 2006). These 
pressures may create a work environment with a premium placed on rapid 
and resource-saving solutions (Barrett & Hamilton-Giachritsis, 2013; 
Mortimer & Shepherd, 1999). A report by the Royal Commission on 
Criminal Justice (1993) states that “variance in skilled performance of the 
tasks imposed on detectives by work systems is the proper target of human 
factors research” (p.13). A recent study in Norway by Knutsson (2013) 
shows that expediency measures are still dominating the official publications 
reflective of quality in criminal investigations. Similar measures prevail also in 
England and Wales (Carson, 2007; Tong, 2009) and in the US (Leo, 2008).  
In line with this tradition of over-suspiciousness and expediency, much 
of the traditional detective practice has picked up a strong tendency towards 
guilt assumption in combination with confirmatory investigation strategies 
(Innes & Brookman, 2013; Kassin, Goldstein, & Savitsky, 2003; Leo, 2008; 
Oxburgh, Fahsing, Haworth, & Blair, 2016; Simon, 2012a). Moreover, 
traditional detective cultures seemingly view their undertaking as a constantly 
on-going ‘information game’ against the suspect, the defence and the courts 
(Hobbs, 1988; Kleinig, 2001). It somehow became a privilege for the police 
to leave out the information that did not fit with their main theory 
(Gudjonsson, 2003; Justitiedepartementet, 2015; Kassin et al., 2010; 
Riksadvokaten, 2015). Accordingly, Leo (2008) describes how American 
detectives viewed an interrogation as a game where the final goal was 
achieved without the objective collection of information. The cultural goal 
was to make the suspect accept and adhere to the main theory of guilt—to 
make him confess. This outsmarting game was “structured to promote 
incrimination, if necessary, over truth-finding” (Leo, 2008, p. 23). 
Accordingly, detectives developed a culture of not publicly revealing their 
actual motivation, strategies, or tactics (Rachlew, 2003). The notion of never 
disclosing anything more than absolutely necessary is still an important 
cultural artefact of the profession (Hobbs, 1988; Kleinig, 2001; Soufan, 
2011). Personal commitment to winning the game was also regarded as vital; 
the more severe the crime, the higher the cultural status of ‘winning’ the case 
and the personal responsibility for restoring justice (Corsianos, 2001, 2003). 
The adversary system of western democracies has been criticized from the 
start for the risk of turning the pursuit of justice into an unfair game where 
the end goal of victory compromises the quality of justice (Langbein, 2003; 
Pound, 1910). If this is the case, it is likely to have shaped traditional 
detective cultures.  
		 8 
A related issue is the notion that good ends can sometimes only be 
achieved by dirty means (Reiner, 2010; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). This has 
created room for what Klockars (1980) defined as “The Dirty Harry 
Problem”. This kind of practice may take many forms, but it ultimately 
means that detectives might drift into professional cultures where the 
perceived good end of solving brutal crimes permits ethically, politically, or 
legally dubious means for its achievement. These darker sides of detective 
work are portrayed in BBC’s TV-series “Life on Mars” with the sometimes 
frighteningly passionate Detective Chief Inspector Gene Hunt as “Dirty 
Harry” (BBC, 2008). Although this production is fictional, the same culture 
and similar methods are represented in numerous official documents (e.g., 
Chatterton, 2008; NOU 2007:7; Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, 
1993; Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, 1981), books (e.g., 
Gudjonsson, 2003; Leo, 2008; Newburn, Williamson, & Wright, 2007; 
Rachlin, 1995; Tong et al., 2009) and journal articles (e.g., Baldwin, 1993; 
Rachlew, 2003; Stelfox & Pease, 2005). As stated by Her Majesty’s Inspector 
of Constabulary: “An emphasis on sanction detection levels has undoubtedly 
to a degree produced the unintended effect of officers spending time 
investigating crimes with a view to obtaining a detection, even when that is 
clearly not in the public interest ” (Flanagan, 2008, p. 10). 
 Bittner (1970) described police work as a ‘tainted occupation’ with an 
inherent drive towards a practice of discretion, building on prejudice rather 
than the strict rules of law. Many officers do not acknowledge such 
disrespectful descriptions of their own occupation and hence dismiss 
research as being biased an unproductive (Bradley & Nixon, 2009). 
Consequently police forces bear a rather restrained relationship to research in 
general, and to the social sciences in particular (Canter & Zukauskiene, 
2007). Higher education was traditionally seen as ‘upper-class’ amongst the 
operational officers. It was considered pointless as it made you rigid, less 
practical, less street-smart and less productive (Hobbs, 1988). In line with 
this, the detective job was modelled upon and practised as a typical 
craftsmanship. As noted by Morris (2007): “Investigation[..] remains an 
artisan craft devoid of any higher intellectual content” (p 24). The internal 
notion of ‘the good detective’ was simply that some officers had an intuitive 
‘nose’ for the job, while others simply did not (Rachlew & Fahsing, 2015; 
Tong et al., 2009). Thus, good detectives with the right combination of 
motivation, intuition and practical experience should be able to quickly 
interpret the information at hand in almost any case, speedily draw the right 
		 9 
inferences and solve it via the most ‘expedient case construction’—often 
synonymous with getting a confession (Innes, 2003; Tong & Bowling, 2006). 
Accordingly, Innes (2003) argued that detectives are not seeking the 
‘absolute’ truth, but rather information that support their own coherent 
narratives of a crime. They are scanning for data or signs which could fit 
with some of their preconceived patterns of crime. In order to create a 
coherent whole inferences are sometimes made to fill information gaps. 
Furthermore, pieces of the jigsaw that do not fit may be omitted from the 
story.  Similarly, Wagenaar, van Koppen, and Crombag (1993) argued that 
the entire judicial process, from the first detection of a potential crime to the 
highest court’s verdict, can be understood as a process of continuous story 
construction. The role of storytelling and narratives in legal settings has 
previously been acknowledged in the context of judges’ and jurors’ decision-
making (Hastie, Penrod, & Pennington, 2002; Pennington & Hastie, 1986, 
1988, 1992). Their verdict in a court case depends on how coherent and 
credible the investigative story is presented by the prosecutor. This 
reconstructive process with its pragmatic and subjective nature is therefore 
not merely a product of expedient detective cultures – it is deeply rooted in 
the principles of human memory and cognition (e.g., Alison, Barrett, & 
Crego, 2007; Cohen, Freeman, & Wolf, 1996; Loftus & Loftus, 1980; Morley, 
1996; Read & Miller, 1995; Schank & Abelson, 1995; Schwartz, 2005).  
 
Investigative Psychology and Environmental Constraints 
In essence, all (major) crime inquiries are information driven (Innes, 2003; 
Wilmer, 1970). In any investigation, complex or straightforward, detective 
work involves solving three inter-related problems: (a) what happened, (b) 
who did it, and (c) can it be proven beyond reasonable doubt? As mentioned 
above, in some cases strongly incriminating evidence is already available from 
the outset of an investigation. These cases are what Innes (2003) termed 
‘self-solvers’. In such circumstances there are typically witnesses to the crime, 
who can identify a suspect in combination with the presence of substantial, 
and incriminating physical evidence. Self-solving investigations tend to be 
structured around three main stages of investigative activity: initial response 
directed towards establishing whether a crime has actually taken place, 
gathering evidence in the form of interviews and inquiries, and finally, case 
construction which involves establishing an account of what has occurred to 
be presented in court.  
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In contrast, ‘whodunit’ investigations are cases where no obvious and 
‘self-solving’ set of cues is present at the outset of the investigation. It is the 
early and judgment-wise, critical phase, of these kind of cases that will be the 
main focus of the present thesis. Typical for this kind of complex and 
potentially ‘high profile’ case are that no direct clues emerge from the 
available evidence (Roach, 2014). Instead, investigators must rely on 
secondary sources of information, typically in the form of vague witness 
statements and ambiguous physical evidence. The quality of this initial 
information might “make or break” the investigation (Wells, Lindsay, & 
Ferguson, 1979). Accordingly, a great deal of the forensic psychological 
research has addressed different methods for enhancing the accuracy and 
detail of witness accounts (see e.g., Kebbell & Wagstaff, 1999; Memon, 
Meissner, & Fraser, 2010), and how to assess the reliability of such 
information (see e.g., Fahsing, Ask, & Granhag, 2004; Hartwig, Granhag, 
Strömwall, & Vrij, 2002; Loftus, 1979; Penrod, Loftus, & Winkler, 1982). 
Consequently, the shortcomings of criminal investigation have often been 
attributed to unreliable witness statements, coercive interrogations of 
suspects and poor interviewing skills (see eg., Fahsing & Rachlew, 2009; 
Gudjonsson, 2003; Kassin, Tubb, Hosch, & Memon, 2001; Milne & Bull, 
1999). This research has undoubtedly complemented the investigative 
interviewing approach which is commonly associated with information-
gathering in criminal investigations (Kebbell & Milne, 1998). When 
investigations go wrong, however, it is an even more fundamental feature of 
the investigations that seem to fail, namely the detectives’ judgements, 
decision-making, and overall supervision of the case (e.g., Alison & Crego, 
2008; Justitiedepartementet, 2015; Macpherson, 1999; NOU 2007:7; Rachlew 
& Fahsing, 2015; Rachlew, 2009; Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, 
1993; van Koppen, 2008).  
A common denominator can be noted between different accounts of 
criminal investigative failures; investigators strive to confirm their initial 
hypothesis, while seemingly ignoring or downplaying conflicting information. 
Accordingly, a number of studies from different traditions have identified 
decision-making abilities as the core in the making of an effective detective 
(e.g., Canter, 2004; Dean et al., 2008; Innes, 2003; Rossmo, 2009; Smith & 
Flanagan, 2000; Westera et al., 2014b). Investigative psychology is therefore 
primarily directed towards the detectives’ cognitive tasks such as the 
processing of information, the identification of different investigative 
scenarios, and decisions on the best investigative strategies or lines of 
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enquiry (Ask & Alison, 2010; Canter, 2000). Research has resulted in valuable 
insights into how detectives experience the task of investigating serious and 
complex crimes such as child abductions, siege incidents, terrorist threats, 
and murders (Hald, 2011; Innes, 2003; Maguire, Noaks, Hobbs, & Brearley, 
1991; Wagenaar et al., 1993). The detectives’ decision environment is often 
far from ideal. Crego and Alison (2004) describe officers’ frustration with 
“having to continuously fight for staff or run an enquiry on a shoestring...” 
(p. 219) not to mention the “complexity involved in handling the 
intrusiveness of the media...” (p. 217). Innes (2003) illustrates how murder 
squad officers experience pressure from a number of sources:  
 
There is always a considerable time pressure involved, 
therefore police officers strive to identify suspects quickly and 
to identify and protect all potential crime scenes and evidence 
from being destroyed or decaying in quality. There is always 
financial pressure to ‘get a result’ as quickly as possible. (p. 658)  
 
Innes (2003) also refers to the pressures officers that come from having 
to handle huge amounts of incoming information at the beginning of an 
investigation, with most of this information probably proving to be irrelevant 
to the critical aspects of the inquiry. In such a problematic decision 
environment, criminal detectives are often left to their own intuitions, field-
experience and rules of thumb (Tong & Bowling, 2006). We have learned a 
great deal about how investigations typically proceed and the challenges that 
investigators face in the complex reality of policing. While this type of 
descriptive knowledge is important in its own right, it tells little about why 
certain obstacles to successful investigative decision making occur and what 
can be done to overcome them. As mentioned earlier topics such as 
eyewitness testimony (e.g., Christianson, 1992; Loftus, 1979; Wells & 
Lindsay, 1980), and investigative interviewing (e.g., Fisher & Geiselman, 
1992; Gudjonsson & Sigurdsson, 1994; Memon, 1999; Memon et al., 2010; 
Milne & Bull, 1999) have bridged much of the gap between the reality of 
policing and psychological research. Within the area of judgement and 
decision-making, however, there are several studies telling detectives’ what 
not to do, but the literature provides very little positive guidance.  Detectives 
would probably have an easier job if they could find support in evidence-
based methods and operational procedures (Ask & Granhag, 2008; Rossmo, 
2009). Interestingly, the famous author Sir Arthur Conan Doyle described 
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the essence of such a method 150 years ago—the abductive logic applied by 
Sherlock Holmes: “How often have I said to you that when you have 
eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be 
the truth?” (Conan Doyle, 1890, p. 111). 
 
Investigation as Sense-making and Abductive Logic 
It has been argued that abductive logic or finding the inference to the best 
explanation should be the starting point for any investigation (Carson, 2009; 
Fraser-Mackenzie, Bucht, & Dror, 2013; Innes, 2003; Keppens & Schafer, 
2004; Lipton, 2007; Rønn, 2013; Simon, 2012a). The term ‘abduction’ was 
coined by Charles Sanders Peirce in his lifelong work on the logic of science. 
Peirce described abduction as the first stage of any inquiry in which we try to 
generate theories which may then later be assessed. He said, “[a]bduction is 
the process of forming explanatory hypotheses” (Peirce, 1965, p. 172). 
Although there is no reference in Peirce's writings on abduction to the 
notion of what constitutes the best explanation (Campos, 2009), it is clear 
that he thought of explanations as competing and more or less satisfactory—
there might even be a best one. This is crucial in much modern work on 
abduction which encompasses a stage concerned with the assessment of 
tentative theories (Lipton, 2007). Abductive logic is widely recognised as a 
powerful mechanism for hypothetical reasoning in the absence of complete 
knowledge and it is generally understood as reasoning from effects to causes. 
It also captures important issues such as reasoning with defaults and beliefs 
(Ciampolini & Torroni, 2004; Josephson, 1994). Abduction has been 
described as ‘the logic of what might be’ and unlike deduction, but similar to 
induction, the conclusions from an abductive argument might turn out to be 
false, even if the premises are true. Unlike induction, abductive logic allows 
for qualified and pragmatic guessing. In deductive reasoning, the conclusion is a 
direct result of the facts presented. Example: Tim cannot see (fact). The condition 
when you cannot see is known as blindness (fact). Hence, Tim is blind 
(deduction). In inductive reasoning, the conclusion is derived from a fact, but an 
inference is added. Example: Tim cannot see (fact). All people who cannot see 
have probably bumped into many objects compared to people who can see 
(inference). Tim will have more accidents than people who can see 
(induction). In abductive reasoning, we try to presume potential facts by using 
supporting facts. Example: Some people cannot see (fact). Tim continued 
walking into objects (supporting fact). Tim might possibly be blind 
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(abduction). This explorative function and the absence of conclusive 
information make abductive inferences non-monotonic 2  and serving as 
argument to the best explanation (Harman, 1965; Kolko, 2010). Hence, in 
abductive logic there is often no room for true falsification like the Sherlock 
Holmes quote above signifies. In the Arthur Conan Doyle story, “The Silver 
Blaze,” are Sherlock Holmes and Scotland Yard Detective Inspector Gregory 
discussing the theft of a racehorse from a country estate that is guarded by a 
fierce watchdog:  
 
Inspector Gregory: "You consider that to be important?"  
Holmes: "Exceedingly so." 
Inspector Gregory: “Is there any point to which you would wish to 
draw my attention?”   
Holmes: “To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.” 
Inspector Gregory: “The dog did nothing in the night-time.” 
Holmes: “That was the curious incident.” 
 
Holmes later explains how the “dog that didn’t bark” helped him to solve the 
crime: “I had grasped the significance of the silence of the dog, for one true 
inference invariably suggests others… A dog was kept in the stables, and yet, 
though someone had been in, and had fetched out a horse, he had not 
barked enough to arouse the two lads in the loft. Obviously the midnight 
visitor was someone whom the dog knew well.” (Doyle, 1892, p. 305). 
Holmes makes an inference based on known facts, in an effort to 
explain them. Holmes is working on the premise that because (a) dogs bark 
loudly at strangers, but not at people they know; and (b) the dog didn’t bark 
loudly, if he barked at all; then (c) the dog knew the intruder. That sounds 
fine at first, and of course Holmes is a renowned problem-solver, at least in 
the world of fictional ink. This is perhaps how many detectives resolve an 
investigative challenge, but this seemingly strong piece of deductive 
reasoning is in reality based on weak or absent information and therefore it is 
abductive and non-monotonic. Holmes assumes that the watchdog behaves 
in a particular manner when, in fact, there might be various reasons why the 
dog wouldn’t bark. Firstly, the dog might have barked, but no one heard. 
Secondly, the stranger might have brought a sausage to appease the dog. A 
third possibility is the dog had been drugged. Because Holmes did not take 																																																								
2 Non-monotonic inferences are defeasible; in contrast to deductive inferences, the conclusions drawn may 
be withdrawn in the light of further information, even though all original premises are retained.  
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these variables into consideration, one might conclude that the logic of 
Holme’s argument is weak and not necessarily the best explanation. A true 
detective should know that this is a hypothesis based on the probability that 
dogs normally bark at strangers—not an absolute fact. Hence, several 
competing explanations may be true and even the best explanation can be 
overturned by new diagnostic information (Peng & Reggia, 1990).  
Abductive reasoning is utilised as an explanatory inference technique 
in a number of applied judgment and decision-making tasks such as medical 
diagnosis (Feltovich, Johnson, Moller, & Swanson, 1984), scientific discovery 
(Peirce, 1965; Thagard, 1989), legal reasoning (Ciampolini & Torroni, 2004; 
Harman, 1965), computer-science (Reiter, 1987) and discourse 
comprehension (Kintsch, 1988). As proposed by a number of studies on 
detective work (Carson, 2009; Hald, 2011; Innes, 2003) abductive logic 
serves well as a model in depicting the criminal investigation as a highly 
fragile, creative and synthetic process. Like other abductive problems, 
criminal investigations are often complicated by the large number of 
potential explanations for an observation, the constant influx of new 
information, and the many possible ways to combine, test, and develop 
competing hypotheses about the most likely explanation. Put another way: 
Abduction plays the role of generating new ideas or hypotheses; deduction 
functions as evaluating the hypotheses; and induction is justifying the 
hypothesis with empirical data (Staat, 1993). According to this view, all 
tentative hypotheses should be formed on the basis of initially available 
information and the detectives’ available schemata of potential crimes and 
their non-criminal alternatives. Ideally, such hypotheses should subsequently 
include assumptions about all likely situations, potential perpetrators, modes 
of conduct, and motives behind an offense. The aim is to keep track of 
alternative explanations of the evidence and to remind the detective of all the 
different avenues of enquiry which should be exhausted. Next, ‘the abductive 
detective’ should deduce and induce predictions from the different 
hypotheses. If they are true, what consequences follow? If they are false, 
what would then follow? In subsequent stages, all the competing hypotheses 
should (as far as possible) be tested through designated investigative actions 
and gradually refined trough attempts of both verification and falsification.  
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Investigation as Hypothesis Testing 
In all diagnostic processes, the first stages are of crucial importance for 
the validity of the rest of the process (Joseph & Patel, 1990; Simon, 2011; 
Sisson, Donnelly, Hess, & Woolliscroft, 1991; Swets, 1988; Wells & Lindsay, 
1980). A reason to believe a crime has been committed is the legal starting 
point for criminal investigations (Stelfox, 2009). Intuitively, therefore, the 
task structure for detectives will always begin with an initial hypothesis of a 
potential crime. As illustrated above, this crime-assumptive starting-point has 
often driven detectives into a search for confirming evidence with little, or 
no, search for disconfirming evidence. The fact that an already formed 
hypothesis leads people to not optimally utilize subsequent data that could 
disconfirm the hypothesis has been demonstrated in a variety of settings 
(Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979; Sainsbury, 1971; Wells, 1980). The so-called 
‘illusory correlation’ can in subsequent stages be particularly hard to disprove 
if the only available data are gathered in light of the first hypotheses 
(Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978; Smedslund, 1963). The term was originally 
coined by Chapman and Chapman (1969) to describe people's tendencies to 
overestimate relationships between two groups when distinctive and unusual 
information is presented. In an experimental study of nurses Smedslund 
(1963) found that nurses’ diagnostic reasoning was mostly based on the 
presence of symptoms, while the (just as diagnostic) absence of symptoms 
were virtually ignored. Similarly, Ward and Jenkins (1965) asked subjects to 
judge the degree of probability between responses and outcomes in a 
guessing task with only two outcomes. Like Smedslund (1963) they found 
that the participants’ perceived control of the judgment task was based 
mainly on their frequency of correct guesses, rather than the actual 
programmed contingency between outcomes and responses. This tendency 
to have difficulties with the processing negative or disconfirming information 
was labelled by Jenkins and Sainsbury (1969) as the Feature Positive Effect 
(FPE). The same tendencies have later been confirmed in a number of 
studies (see eg., Kite & Whitley Jr, 2016).  
Taken together, there is a weakness in our ability to comprehend 
statistical contingency in practical tasks. It is, for example, a well know 
problem that the scientific literature is biased by the underrepresentation of 
papers yielding nonsignificant findings, and a resulting misunderstanding 
regarding the potential value of such results (Rosenthal, 1979).  
In a recent article in Nature, Nuzzo (2015) points out how researchers 
seem to fool themselves by collecting evidence in favour of a hypothesis, 
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instead of looking for other explanations or evidence against it. This 
“hypothesis myopia” might stem from a restraint in the capacity and/or 
motivation to consider alternative hypotheses at early stages of testing. A 
classical problem identified both in experimental research (Koehler, 1991; 
Nuzzo, 2015; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986) and in the investigation of 
criminal cases (Ask & Alison, 2010), is the investigators’ failure to identify all 
plausible alternatives before they start collecting, evaluating and integrating 
information to arrive at a choice. Accordingly, Fischhoff (1982) suggested 
that one of the most effective strategies for reducing judgmental biases is to 
make individuals systematically consider alternatives—a debiasing strategy 
recommended already by the 17th-century philosopher Francis Bacon (Lord, 
Lepper, & Preston, 1984). This so-called “Baconian approach to probability” 
argues that regardless of how many favourable results exist for a hypothesis, 
it only takes one unfavourable result to disprove it. Hence, reliable evidential 
tests should be designed to eliminate any hypothesis that is under 
consideration. The hypothesis that best resists the most concerted efforts to 
eliminate it – is the one which we should hold with most confidence 
(Klamberg, 2015). Such a procedure encourages the decision-maker to 
generate evidence that supports alternative outcomes, resulting in a more 
balanced and objective evaluation of the relevant evidence at the time of 
judgment.  
The importance of such a legally defined obligation to promote 
accuracy goals in the criminal justice process is supported by numerous 
studies demonstrating that persons asked to test a single hypothesis select 
different information than subjects asked to test the same hypothesis against 
specific alternatives (Bassok & Trope, 1984; Kruglanski & Mayseless, 1988). 
Hence, the search for diagnostic information is context-dependent. Thus, a 
systematic consideration of all the competing options should lead people to 
use a more thorough and qualitatively better judgmental process (Hirt & 
Markman, 1995). The notion of considering the opposite (of guilt) also lies 
behind the presumption of innocence, a fundamental principle of fair trial 
(Stumer, 2010) and the burden of proof (Diesen, 2000; Kolflaath, 2015). 
Notably, all reasonable conflicting theories should be ruled out before a 
guilty verdict can be passed in a criminal court. As stated by (Zuckerman & 
Roberts, 1989), “the fact-finder has to follow a mental procedure of 
progressive elimination of explanations consistent with innocence” (p. 134).  
A number of subsequent studies have proven this strategy effective for 
reducing the negative effects of several known cognitive sources of error, 
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such as for example confirmation bias (Lord et al., 1984), hindsight bias 
(Sanna & Schwarz, 2003), and overconfidence (Koriat, Lichtenstein, & 
Fischhoff, 1980). The ‘consider the alternatives strategy’ goes beyond the 
task at a hand (Hirt, Kardes, & Markman, 2004; Keeney & Raiffa, 1993), and 
can stimulate creative thinking and analytical problem-solving by invoking 
changes in mind-sets (Markman, Lindberg, Kray, & Galinsky, 2007; 
Markman, McMullen, & Elizaga, 2008). A similar approach is advocated in 
section 23(1) of the British Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act (1996) 
code of practice, which states: “where a criminal investigation is conducted, 
the investigator must take all reasonable steps for the purposes of the 
investigation and pursue all reasonable lines of enquiry, whether these point 
towards or away from the suspect”. The Norwegian practice of criminal law 
is essentially similar (Strandbakken, 2003). In fact, this fundamental legal 
obligation is a norm for the evaluation of evidence in most modern 
democracies (Klamberg, 2015; Langbein, 2003). This normative quality 
dimension, embedded in principles from early Roman Law (Stumer, 2010), 
can only be understood as a warning against fast and frugal decisions in 
criminal cases. As noted by Packer (1968): “The presumption of innocence is 
a direction to officials of how they are to proceed, not a prediction of the 
outcome”(p. 161). Ormerod, Barrett, and Taylor (2008) define the ability to 
step back from conjunctive conclusions and consider alternative and weaker 
hypotheses as the most valuable sense-making skill of a criminal detective. 
Sense-making is described as a set of judgements and decisions that are 
initiated when an individual, or organization, recognizes the shortage of their 
current understanding of events (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). This 
activity includes thorough problem recognition, problem framing, and option 
generation (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). According to the recognition-
metacognition model for unrecognized situations (Cohen et al., 1996), sense-
making can be understood as an active two-way process of testing data 
against mental stories and building stories around the data. Neither data nor 
story comes first; data evoke stories and stories select and connect data 
(Hald, 2011; Ormerod et al., 2008; Wagenaar, 1995).  
 
Models of Investigative Decision-Making 
Baron (2008) divides decision models into three categories: descriptive, 
normative, and prescriptive. The aim of descriptive models is to describe 
how decision makers actually make decisions. Heuristics, which are rules of 
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thumb, provide such descriptions and are usually compared with some ideal 
or normative way of making decisions. The aim of normative models is to 
provide policies or axioms that can aid an optimal and rational decision in 
certain situations. Normative models are sometimes too computationally 
demanding or time-consuming for practical use (Baron, 2008) – therefore we 
need prescriptive models. Prescriptive models create prescriptions of how 
humans should make decisions. Like normative models, the prescriptive 
models should stimulate productive judgment and decision procedures, 
heuristics, or rules of thumb. As shown above, abductive logic might serve as 
a model of how investigative information can be processed from evidence to 
possible explanation.  
The sequence of mental operations that takes place between the 
presentation of a stimulus and the execution of a response is fundamental in 
psychology. Transferred to the domain of judgments and decision-making 
this is often described as ‘information processing’ (Montgomery & Svenson, 
1976). Characterised by Montgomery (1983) as a search for a dominance 
structure, an attempt to find a representation of the decision problem such 
that one alternative is ‘dominant’, i.e., it is superior to all others on at least 
one attribute and is not inferior to any alternative on any of the other 
attributes. Search for dominance was hypothesised to pass through four 
phases (Montgomery, 1989, p. 24): pre-editing—establishing relevant 
decision alternatives and attributes; finding a promising alternative; testing 
whether the most promising alternative dominates the other alternatives; and 
dominance which refers to structuring, or transforming the psychological 
representation of alternatives so that dominance can be achieved. Likewise, 
Svenson (1996) describes is as a structural cognitive process from problem 
presentation to decision-making involving collection of traces, data, theories 
and hypotheses testing. Svenson (1992; 1996) also suggested the so-called 
differentiation and consolidation theory, which proposes four stages in the 
decision process: (a) detection of the decision problem; (b) differentiation of 
an initially chosen alternative from the other alternatives; (c) the decision 
stage; and (d) the post-decision consolidation stage. Svenson’s theory assigns 
considerable weight to post-decision processes; not only are they viewed as 
important in their own right for providing a complete picture of how 
decisions are reached, but since decision processes often are iterative or 
cyclic they also influence the pre-decision differentiation phase. The 
implications of this processing approach have influenced the methods used 
to study decision-making processes. 
		 19 
Much of the available research on detectives’ decision-making can be 
understood in light of such information processing models. The line of 
experimental research conducted by Ask, Granhag and colleagues (e.g., 2006; 
2007a; 2008; 2011) has typically tested how different situational and 
individual factors interfere with detectives’ evaluation including: (a) an 
emphasis upon the staged and temporal dimensions of detectives’ decision 
making; (b) a revitalisation of the picture of the detective as an adaptive 
decision maker which ideally should draw upon a range of possible strategies 
in order to reach a decision; and (c) the notion that detectives should be able 
to take in new information and develop their representation of the problem 
before they reach a final decision. Accordingly, Canter and Alison (1999) 
formulate a normative model for criminal investigation: “good thinking is 
represented by a thorough search for alternatives without favouring what 
one already has in mind” (p. 30).  
In other domains such applied models have been designed for dealing 
with decision-making under uncertainty or predictions. For example, Hart, 
Sturmey, Logan, and McMurran (2011) have described how case formulation 
can operationalize tacit knowledge within evidence-based violence risk 
assessments and create a more focused dialogue between the members of the 
clinical profession. Such models does not automatically solve the problem, 
but is meant to aid the formulation of the problem and with the integration 
of information to develop a more concise account of the situation (Belton & 
Stewart, 2002). Similar models have not yet been developed for legal 
decision-making. Researchers have, however, found similar tacit knowledge 
structures within the field of criminal investigation. Innes (2003) describes 
how major inquiries are typically organised as a five-stage sequence. This 
includes (1) an initial response that is the collection of the available evidence 
from the scene and witnesses; (2) the information burst stage refers to the 
activation and active acquisition of the mass of potentially relevant (and 
mostly irrelevant) information; (3) suspect development is concerned with 
the formulation of potential ‘prime suspects’; (4) suspect targeting is 
concerned with the evaluation of evidence necessary to charge one of the 
suspects and finally, (5) case construction is concerned with eliciting a full 
narrative account of the crime for use in court. Dean (2000) identified a 
similar 5-staged process in his studies of experienced Australian detectives. 
He named the stages ‘the 5 C’s’ (collect, check, consider, connect and 
construct). Dean, Fahsing, and Gottschalk (2006) found that detectives from 
Norway and Singapore acknowledged Dean’s model as representative for 
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their daily work. Fahsing (2014) has later suggested a modification of Dean’s 
concept into a generic and cyclic process description for investigative tasks. 
The Investigative Cycle (see Figure 1) is described as a cyclic problem-
solving process that may help detectives focus on the diagnostic process and 
strive for accuracy. Based on the available findings from psychological 
research demonstrating the difficulties people have performing exhaustive 
and unbiased hypothesis testing (Ask et al., 2008; Klayman & Ha, 1987; 
Thomas, Dougherty, Sprenger, & Harbison, 2008), Fahsing (2014) added a 
6th C to Dean’s model – consult. This is to remind detectives of the fact that 
in critical situations they should always consult someone else. Either to get a 
critical view on their own judgements, or to entertain new declarative 
knowledge – or both. Ideally such steps and the result of them should be 
documented in a decision-log. The effect of formalizing dissent or the so-
called ‘Devils-advocate’ approach has proven to be an important debiasing 
strategy in complex decision-making (Herbert & Estes, 1977; Schwenk, 
1990). This process of hypotheses refinement, information gathering and re-
testing should ideally run as long as there is legally obtainable information 
available and a need to strengthen the case construction (Dean et al., 2008; 
Dean & Gottschalk, 2007). In criminal investigations this normally means 
the detective should try to answer the six investigative questions – the 6 W’s 
(see eg., Cook & Tattersall, 2014; Hald, 2011). Who did What to whom? 
Why, hoW, Where and When did it happen?  
Figure 1 - Investigation as a 6 step cyclic process to answer the 6 
investigative questions 
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In a recent report from the Prosecutor General in Norway after an 
enquiry of the scandalous cases against the alleged serial murder Sture 
Bergwall (see e.g., Ask & Alison, 2010, p. 49), the ‘Investigative Cycle’ was 
recommended as an example of a shared generic model for legal fact-finding 
worth pursuing. Hence, the lack of a shared conceptual model for legal fact-
finding stands out as a major systemic shortcoming – both in the daily 
investigative task, and in the critical interaction between detectives, 
prosecutors, defence lawyers and judges.  
Criminal investigations and all other forms of legal fact-finding should 
be approached and understood as sense-making processes. Kolko (2010) 
describes such processes as a ‘synthesis of design’ where the completeness of 
the design is heavily dependent on two critical factors: (a) the access to data, 
and (b) the ability of the observer to explore them with all the relevant 
hypotheses. Both factors are strongly dependent on the phenomenological 
insight and the diagnostic capacity of the sense-maker since certain data only 
will appear in light of certain schemata and vice versa. This close interaction 
between theory and data can be held as fundamental to all discoveries—
scientific or not (see eg., Kuhn, 1970; Simon, 2012b).  Several sense-making 
models exist that are based on cognitive processes (Pirolli & Card, 2005). 
Figure 2 illustrates the investigative process as a sense-making loop model 
(Pirolli & Card, 2005) composed of a series of iteratively accessible steps 
from the first trace of data interacting with the cognitive schemata of the 
detective which may develop this information into testable hypotheses and 
the result of the tests might serve as evidence in a criminal case construction.  
 
Figure 2 - Investigation as a synthesis of design created through a process 
of abductive sense-making 
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The process of interlinked decisions and hypotheses-testing activities should 
optimally result in the verification of one hypothesis that represents the best 
available construction of the truth, and a reasonable elimination of all 
plausible competing hypotheses. As already mentioned, investigative practice 
has not adopted much of the available knowledge nor from general cognitive 
psychology or from the emerging knowledge base on decision theory applied 
to criminal investigations (Dror, 2012; Hald & Rønn, 2013; Stelfox & Pease, 
2005). Consequently, a systematic way of processing information is still not 
common knowledge or standard methodological practice for criminal 
detectives (Tong, 2009). In a study of 142 suspect interviews by British Fraud 
investigators Walsh and Bull (2010) found that using the PEACE - model for 
investigative interviewing contributed to overall interview quality. When it 
comes to judgment and decision-making, no comparable models have been 
developed or scientifically tested. Even the most updated guidelines and 
handbooks for detectives fall short of conceptualising a detailed and 
evidence-based model on how to think and decide in criminal investigations. 
As an example, the so-called ‘National Decision Model’ (ACPO, 20011) does 
not provide much positive guidance, as it tells the reader to:  
1. Gather information,  
2. Assess threats and develop a working strategy,  
3. Consider Powers and Policy,  
4. Identify Options and Contingencies and finally,  
5. Take action.  
 
According to Cook and Tattersall (2014) the model is supposed to be used in 
combination with the 5WH-method (Who, Where, What, When, Why and 
How) and the so-called ‘Investigative Mind-set’ which is defined by the 
ABC-rule (Assume nothing, Believe nothing, Challenge and Check 
everything). The Murder Investigation Manual (ACPO, 2000) is presented as 
a silver bullet to ensure successful and ethical investigations in critical and 
major incidents. Unfortunately, however, instead of expressing awareness 
and humbleness toward this highly complex task, the publication seems to 
uphold an existing culture of overconfidence within the police organisations. 
It is a paradox that while influential researchers in human decision making 
identified criminal justice as a particularly risky arena in the early 1970s 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), the ACPO manuals shy away from promoting 
any of the available knowledge based on decision-making research. This lack 
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of awareness and evidence-based countermeasures probably makes 
detectives just as prone to cognitive bias and shortcomings as anybody else, 
if not more.  
BOUNDED RATIONALITY, HEURISTICS, AND 
COGNITIVE BIASES IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 
 
Human judgments, decisions and discoveries will always be based on varying 
degrees of belief and uncertainty (Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002). To 
cope with uncertainty, people tend to rely on a limited number of heuristics 
and principles that reduce complexity thereby generating simpler judgement 
and decision strategies. In everyday life, heuristics are helpful as they 
generally make our decisions more effective by guiding us in the right 
direction more often than not (Simon, 1977). However, in high-stake 
situations, where information is limited, the same heuristics, due to a number 
of known biases, may be just as fatal as they are helpful (e.g., Evans, 1989; 
Nickerson, 1998; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973b).   
 
Cognitive Bias 
In the early 1970s, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman introduced the 
term ‘cognitive bias’ to describe systematic and irrational patterns in human 
judgment and decision-making. The heuristics and biases research 
programme was inspired by Herbert Simon’s notion of bounded (human) 
rationality. In the late 1950s, Simon challenged the research on classical 
rational choice, which was concerned mostly with the formalization of 
normative solutions to judgment and decision-making problems through 
probability-theory and statistics (Grove & Meehl, 1996).  The bounded 
rationality idea holds that the study of judgment and decision-making should 
take into consideration inescapable environmental and cognitive constraints 
(e.g. limited time, information, and cognitive capacity). Humans differ from 
statistical machines in many ways and the so-called objective truth is not 
always relevant, or comparable, to human decision-making (Simon, 1955). To 
cope with, for example, limited working memory capacity, situational 
complexity and dilemmas we have developed a variety of simple decision 
strategies called heuristics to cope with, for example, limited working 
memory capacity, situational complexity and dilemmas. According to Simon 
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(1957), simplification of complex problems is essential in order to render 
them realistically solvable to humans. Rather than maximize or optimize, 
agents can employ procedures that exploit the simplification to solve the 
problem in a manner that is in some sense “good enough” or satisficing (pp. 
204-205). Kahneman and Tversky demonstrated that everyday judgements 
do not adhere to laws of probability or simple statistical principles (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1973a). Hence, they argued that the underlying processes in 
human decision-making are altogether different to those implied by rational 
choice models. They identified a connection between heuristics and cognitive 
biases which systematically led people astray in relatively simple tasks of 
probability assessment (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). Contrary to Simon, 
who suggested that people would make economically rational decisions if 
only they could gather enough information, Kahneman and Tversky 
suggested that due to cognitive biases people will often decide against their 
own economic interest even when they ‘know’ better. Kahneman and 
Tversky argued that cognitive biases occur when heuristics trigger a tendency 
to make a choice that is highly inaccurate or outright wrong. The 
predictability of the biases invoked research into the cognitive mechanisms 
that caused them—the function of the heuristics. The heuristics and biases 
programme has later come to be viewed as one of the most influential 
research programmes in the history of modern psychology (Eysenck & 
Keane, 2005). These information-processing shortcuts, of course, do not 
operate in isolation, but in a combination with other regulating factors and 
situational dynamics such as perceptual capacity (e.g., Schank & Abelson, 
1995; Simon, 1955), emotional and moral motivations (e.g., Bodenhausen, 
1993; Easterbrook, 1959), and social influence (e.g., Anderson, Lepper, & 
Ross, 1980; Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Accordingly, subsequent research has 
identified a number of cognitive limitations, heuristics, and biases (Gilovich 
et al., 2002). The heuristics and biases with particular relevance for this thesis 
will be covered below (for a more complete coverage, see e.g. Gilovich et al., 
2002; Kiser, 2010). 
The anchoring and adjustment heuristic was first coined by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) as a consistent two-stage process by which people 
estimate values. First, a reference point is established, based on an initial 
value known as the anchor. This can be either presented in situ or in the 
form of self-generated (from previous) knowledge. Next, people make one 
or a series of revisions (i.e., adjustments) to the anchor to arrive at a final 
estimation. Kahneman and Tversky noted that the initial values that people 
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were exposed to had a dramatic effect, influencing subsequent revisions. 
When “adjustments” were typically too small and biased towards the anchor, 
they resulted in inaccurate final estimations (Kataoka, Latham, & Whyte, 
1997). As mentioned, research suggests that police often seem to suffer from 
a ‘guilt bias’ (Leo, 2008; Meissner & Kassin, 2002; van Koppen, 2008). This 
is quite natural since it is in their job to find the guilty person when a crime 
has occurred and a documented reason to suspect guilt must be present in 
order to legally commence a criminal investigation.  However, if the default 
anchor for any investigation is guilt, then the adjustments made probably will 
circle around this anchor making adjustments towards the mandatory 
presumption of innocence (Zuckerman, 1994) seem very far and hard to 
reach. Readers are referred to Wagenaar (1995) for more a comprehensive 
overview of how anchored narratives may hamper sound processing of 
evidence in the criminal justice system.   
The availability heuristic defines the tendency to judge probability on the 
basis of how easily examples come to mind (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973a). 
This type of availability heuristic can be helpful and important in decision-
making (e.g., Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999). Faced with the need to make an 
immediate decision, the availability heuristic allows people to quickly arrive at 
a conclusion, which in many situations may be both accurate and correct. 
For example, a very basic, but also difficult, human activity like hunting 
would be very hard without such immediate decisions and actions. Things 
that easily come to mind are believed to be more common and more 
accurate reflections of the world. This is probably why people go on buying 
new lottery tickets after a win in hopes of winning again, why they assume 
that vicious murders are more likely than suicides, and why they are afraid of 
flying due to fear of crashing. Fast assessments are made under the principle 
‘if you can think of it, it must be important’. Statistically, all of these 
incidences are very unlikely to happen to any of us, but the relevant base-rate 
information is often suppressed by what first strikes our mind. Hence, the 
first thing you can think of gains more prominence than other equally valid 
evidence. A related effect to both the availability heuristic (above) and the 
representativeness heuristic (below) is the feature-positive effect. In a series of 
experiments with both animals and humans Smedslund (1963) and Jenkins 
and Sainsbury (1969) showed that the presence of instances have more 
influence on our learning and judgments than their absence – like in the 
popular saying; ‘out of sight - out of mind’. In forensic settings, this disregard 
of the diagnostic value of negative information was first demonstrated by 
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Wells and Lindsay (1980) in an archival study of line-ups. They found that 
positive line-up identifications of suspects were considered far more 
informative than non-identifications. This fundamental tendency toward 
positive testing strategies can lead to an illusion of correlation even for totally 
unrelated events. Accordingly, the availability heuristic might especially 
impede the detection and investigation of rare crimes (Rossmo, 2009), such 
as child sex homicides or maternal infanticide (Roach & Bryant, 2015) 
because few coroners and detectives have experienced such crimes and they 
are surrounded by a considerable degree of shame and taboo (Ottesen, 
2012). Similarly, the representativeness heuristic allows for rapid judgements based 
on a match with the most prominent cognitive prototype that exists our 
mind (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). A prototype is what we think is the 
most relevant or typical example of a particular event or object. This 
heuristic can be adaptive, allowing for a quick linkage of the most likely 
alternative. For example, if a woman were found dead in her home, the most 
prominent cognitive prototype would be to investigate the role of a potential 
life partner. On the other hand, it would be clearly wrong to automatically 
assume that her partner is the murderer, eventhough that often turns out to 
be the case. The investigation of serious crimes is not always a complex 
matter. It is sometimes a quite straightforward task (Brookman & Innes, 
2013). This unpredictable alteration between simple and complex 
investigations makes the detective job even more captivating. In Europe, the 
crime statistics shows that the vast majority of investigated homicides lead to 
a conviction. This may be a reflection of the low homicide rates and the 
adequacy of law enforcement and criminal justice resources, as well as the 
fact that in the vast majority of homicides the victim and perpetrator are 
often known to each other. In Finland, for example, 90 per cent of all 
homicide victims between 2003 and 2011 were known to the offender 
(UNODC, 2013). This increases the likelihood that an investigation will 
establish a clear link between the perpetrator and the crime at an early stage. 
The statistical overrepresentation of certain patterns in homicide, and the 
strong underrepresentation of others, create a serious risk that phenomena 
occurring less often might escape the consideration of the detective.  
Framing effects. The presentation of information will often influence its 
interpretation; hence information always is understood within a context or a 
frame. In a series of experiments Tversky and Kahneman (1981) found that 
their participants systematically differed in their choices when (the same) 
options were presented as gains (positive frame) or as losses (negative 
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frame). Likewise, the strength or relevance of (the same) evidence might be 
weighted differently depending on how it impacts the hypothesis.  In a series 
of studies Ask et al. (2008) and Ask, Reinhard, et al. (2011) found that police 
trainees and law students displayed asymmetrical scepticism and substantial 
elasticity in their interpretation of the available evidence depending on the 
perceived strength of the evidence and how well it fitted initial hypothesis of 
guilt. Likewise, do dramatic effects of framing often take place in the 
courtroom, where opposing legal counsel present and argue variant positions 
on how to interpret evidence (Simon, 2012).   
Ideally, observations that clearly violate prior expectations should cause 
adjustment towards more thorough and accurate information processing. 
However, the hindsight bias may diminish such adjustment (Fischhoff, 1975). 
Hindsight bias is one of the most frequently cited and researched cognitive 
biases in the psychological literature (eg., Arkes, Wortmann, Saville, & 
Harkness, 1981; Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, 1991; Guilbault, Bryant, 
Brockway, & Posavac, 2004; Hawkins & Hastie, 1990). For example 
Fischhoff and Beyth (1975) were concerned with professionals such as 
clinicians’ or politicians’ exaggerated beliefs of having known all along how 
their patients would recover or how elections were going to turn out. In an 
experiment, they asked participants from two different universities to assess 
the probabilities of various possible outcomes concerning upcoming events, 
such as President Nixon’s historic journeys to China and the Soviet Union 
(e.g., Pres. Nixon will meet Chairman Mao; Pres. Nixon will announce that 
the trip was a success). After the trips, participants were asked to recall their 
own predictions. The results showed that participants tended to exaggerate 
what they had known in foresight. Hence, our scepticism and scrutiny are 
not evenly distributed; the facts that do not match one’s views are more 
easily twisted, or ignored, than the facts that do (Petty, Fleming, Priester, & 
Feinstein, 2001). Although some issues remain unanswered, cognitive consistency 
theories play a significant role in the understanding of human reasoning and 
decision-making. Several studies have documented the existence of hindsight 
bias with regard to judgments in criminal cases. Bodenhausen (1990) found 
that mock jurors’ interpretation of a case was influenced by their knowledge 
of the outcome of a prior criminal trial of the same case. Specifically, the 
evidence was perceived as more incriminating when the defendant had 
previously been found guilty, and less incriminating when the defendant had 
been found not guilty as compared with an unknown-outcome condition. In 
a study of hindsight effects in relation to the trial of O. J. Simpson, Bryant 
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and Brockway (1997) found that participants’ a-priori probability ratings for 
a conviction of Simpson decreased considerably immediately after 
participants became aware of the acquittal verdict. In another study on 
mock-jurors by Simon, Snow, and Read (2004), found that participants 
displayed lower agreement with evidence that conflicted with a verdict after 
(as opposed to before) they had committed to the verdict, indicating a post-
commitment rejection of dissonant information. Hence, recent research such 
as; Glöckner and Engel (2013) and Simon, Stenstrom, and Read (2015) 
suggests that cognitive consistency theories should play a greater role in the 
understanding of legal reasoning and decision-making. Information that falls 
outside of our expectations and/or challenges a held belief on a topic 
normally generates conflicts in the structural psychological balance (Heider, 
1958) and may cause cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957; Harmon-Jones & 
Harmon-Jones, 2008). Numerous studies have shown that we are able to 
adjust our recollection, our conclusions and even fabricate stories in order to 
make sense of the past, the present or the future and thereby reducing 
imbalance and dissonance between new information and old beliefs. A series 
of experiments on simulated legal decision-making and evidence evaluation 
shows that coherence-shifts in one decision task can trigger shifts in a 
subsequent decision task involving similar underlying issues (See e.g., Simon, 
2011, 2012a; Simon & Holyoak, 2002; Simon et al., 2004; Simon, 2012b). 
Their findings suggest that legal reasoning processes are bidirectional (guilty 
vs. innocent) in nature and evaluations of the evidence shift toward 
coherence with the emerging decision. Although these studies were 
conducted in laboratory settings and were not specifically directed towards 
criminal investigation, they do connect well with the above-mentioned 
findings from Ask, Granhag, et al. Ask, Granhag, et al. (2011); Ask, 
Reinhard, et al. (2011); Marksteiner, Ask, Reinhard, and Granhag (2011). 
Ask, Granhag and colleagues demonstrated how police officers in 
investigative settings displayed substantial elasticity in their interpretation of 
the available evidence depending on the perceived strength of the evidence 
and how well it fitted an initial hypothesis of guilt. The findings indicate that 
people engaging in legal reasoning in the presence of outcome knowledge, 
reinterpret the past to create an account that predicts the observed outcome. 
Another serious consequence of this effect is that it might seriously reduce 
our ability to learn systematically from the past and to evaluate our decisions 
(more) objectively. As stated by Bazerman and Chugh (2006): “In a world 
where everyone knew it all along, there is very little left to learn”(p. 90). 
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Order-effects refer to how the timing and order in which information 
appears might affect its saliency, even when the order is unimportant. The 
primacy effect implies that information presented early on in a series is weighted 
more heavily than subsequent information. The effect is found to be 
particularly salient when initial information presented is viewed as negative 
(Miller & Campbell, 1959; Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002; Tetlock, 1983). 
The reverse applies for the recency effect, where information presented late in a 
session has a comparatively greater influence on the final decision made 
(Peters & Terborg, 1975). The order of how evidence is presented or 
discovered has also been found to affect the judgements of detectives 
(Richter & Kruglanski, 1998), crime analysts (Ask & Granhag, 2005; Dahl, 
Brimacombe, & Lindsay, 2008), law students (Kerstholt & Eikelboom, 2007), 
and judges (Dhami & Ayton, 2001; Eerland & Rassin, 2012; Kerstholt & 
Jackson, 1998). A study by Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, Frey, and Thelen (2001) 
found that the interpretation of information presented sequentially, as 
opposed to simultaneously, was more strongly influenced by participants’ 
initial hypothesis, and it made them less able to generate competing 
hypotheses. In criminal investigations, it is the rule rather than the exception 
that information is acquired sequentially. This increases the risk that early 
evidence influences the assessment of later evidence. A central problem, 
therefore, is story-construction based on subsets, rather than the sum, of the 
evidence. Evidence discovered late in an investigation is therefor less likely to 
be evaluated in an unbiased way, and conflicting information that fails to 
support the initial hypotheses, or lines of enquiry, may be discovered but 
rejected, or not even discovered (e.g., Ask et al., 2008; Brookman & Innes, 
2013; Hope, Memon, & McGeorge, 2004; O’Brien, 2009).  
Overconfidence. In general, people tend to overestimate their own 
capabilities and have too strong a belief in the correctness of their own 
knowledge and judgements. This overconfidence helps us preserve our 
motivation and self-esteem (Adams & Adams, 1960). The same illusion, 
however is called the most “pervasive and potentially catastrophic” of all the 
cognitive biases since accidents, catastrophes and even wars arise due to an 
underestimation of the severity of the situation and an overestimation of 
actors’ own capacity (Blanton, 2001; Taylor & Brown, 1988). Experts and 
authority figures seem to suffer even more from the overconfidence effect 
than do laypeople (Plous, 1993). For instance, the experts in The Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) seriously overestimated their 
control of the rapidly escalating situation when the hurricane Katrina struck 
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New Orleans, with devastating consequences (Tak, Driscoll, Bernard, & 
West, 2007). Hence, the pervasive effects of overconfidence may seriously 
impact detectives’ judegments as well. For example, at a US conference on 
suspect interrogation, the detectives were asked if the psychological influence 
by interrogators might compel even innocent person to confess to crimes. 
“No,” replied one participant, “because we don’t interrogate innocent 
people” (Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004, p. 51). Similarly, in a study of British 
fraud investigators Walsh and Milne (2007) found that the vast majority of 
line managers believed themselves to be sufficiently skilled despite the fact 
that 50 per cent of their staff said otherwise. Due to such wishful 
assessments of the situation and of their own performance, even highly 
mistaken decision-makers may remain confidently optimistic about their 
future decisions and see no need to improve their thinking (Armor & Taylor, 
1998).  
Groupthink is the reluctance to think critically and challenge the theory 
that dominates within a team or group of human actors. Expressing minority 
or alternative views put us at risk of being disliked, whereas sharing majority 
views can give us a feeling of inclusion based on a (sometimes) false sense of 
security or confidence. Typically, this occurs once a dominant member of a 
group posts a certain opinion. Out of loyalty, other members not only accept 
that view, but also start defending it as their own. Because it is a matter of 
loyalty to the leader, it does not matter if the standpoint is right or wrong. A 
group with diverse competencies may be a great tool for a critical assessment 
of the ruling ideas.  The “groupthink effect”, however, might lead the group 
members into conformity and collective blindness towards alternative views 
(Janis, 1982). Political and military fiascos, such as the Bay of Pigs Invasion, 
the Vietnam War, the Watergate scandal and the 2003 invasion of Iraq are all 
largely said to be examples of the ensnaring effect of groupthink and social 
influence. In a classic experiment, Asch (1955), found that groups of 
strangers could persuade people to agree on statements that were obviously 
false by endorsing the false value as if it were correct. In an equally classic 
study of obedience, Milgram (1963) and other psychologists found that 
research participants were often willing to obey authority figures even when 
doing so clearly violated their morality and conscience. Similarly, in the so-
called ‘Stanford prison experiment’, Haney, Banks, and Zimbardo (1973) 
found that decent people have natural tendency to be corrupted by powerful 
roles. Therefore, the usual team structure in major crime investigations, 
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where detectives work under the command of a senior officer, does not 
necessarily offer any protection against biases and tunnel vision.  
Lastly, any criminal investigation risks being subjected to confirmation 
bias. Named by Evans (1989) as a “perhaps the best known and most widely 
accepted notion of inferential error to come out of the literature on human 
reasoning” (p. 41). The term was introduced in 1960 by Peter Wason, who 
after a series of experiments on hypothesis testing concluded that 
participants showed a preference for confirmation over falsification (Wason, 
1960, 1968). Subsequent research has consistently shown a strong preference 
for positive testing strategies (see eg., Nickerson, 1998). A number of studies 
show a robust inclination towards a belief-consistent interpretation of 
available information (Klayman & Ha, 1987) and the search for new 
information (Klayman, 1995; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Wason & Johnson-
Laird, 1972). In everyday life, the confirmation bias is somewhat helpful as it 
reflects adaptive behaviour, and reduces the cognitive load required to 
evaluate and execute complex decisions. Just like the rest of the “fast and 
frugal” psychological heuristics and mechanisms, it filters and integrates new 
information to form a coherent system of values, beliefs and actions. The 
effect of confirmation bias is so hard-wearing that beliefs persist even after 
the information that formed the beliefs has been discredited or withdrawn 
(Nickerson, 1998). The psychological investment in establishing and 
maintaining beliefs is too high to abandon them just because the underlying 
information is later proven to be false or irrelevant (Jonas et al., 2001; Lord 
et al., 1979; Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972). The phenomenon has proven 
strikingly robust across diverse domains of human thinking, including logical 
problem-solving (Hastie & Dawes, 2010; Hoffer, 1951; Lord et al., 1979), 
social interaction (Wason, 1968), medical reasoning (Snyder & Swann, 1978), 
military intelligence (Elstein, Shulman, & Sprafka, 1978) and in courts and 
police investigations  (Cook & Smallman, 2008; Ask & Granhag, 2005).  
 
Moderating Factors 
Simon (1990) describes the factors that impact our rational behaviour as 
acting like a pair of scissors. Rather than being separate and unrelated the 
external and internal factors that surround our rationality are intimately 
bound together.  As Simon put it, ‘‘Human rational behaviour . . . is shaped 
by scissors whose two blades are the structure of the task environments and 
the computational capabilities of the actor’’ (Simon, 1990, p. 7). Hence, the 
scissor will only work if the two blades fit and work together. Moreover, 
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Simon argues that a result of adaptation to the environment, we are prone to 
make pragmatic and satisfying decisions based on the information available 
rather than optimal decisions based on the information we could have had. 
Related to bounded rationality is Brunswick’s lens model (1952) which 
describes how the individual adapts and reacts based on cues or information 
from the environment. Brunswick argued that in order to understand human 
decision-making, or cognition in general, the environment in which the 
decision-making is taking place should always be considered. Later research 
has identified a number of factors that can moderate the influence of the 
above heuristics and biases on human decision-making. Time pressure and 
motivation are particularly relevant in the current context as they feature 
prominently in criminal detectives’ work environment.   
 Time-pressure is pervasive in the criminal investigation environment. 
For example, if sound decisions are not made and acted on during the initial 
phase, it is, according to Stelfox (2009), “...highly unlikely that those who 
carry out investigative activity later in the process can compensate for these 
lost opportunities” (p.153). The ACPO Core Investigative Doctrine (2012) 
notes that the first opportunity to gather material may be the last. This raised 
awareness is often referred to as the ‘golden hour’ principle. Thus, it is 
important that good decisions are made during the early stage of an 
investigation to ensure that all potential sources of material are explored 
properly before being lost or contaminated. On the other hand has 
psychological research consistently found that time-pressure affects the 
quality of our judgements and decisions (Svenson & Maule, 1993). Fore 
example, do a number of studies show how time-pressure reduces the 
decision maker’s flexibility and creativity (Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 1956; 
Kaplan, Wanshula, & Zanna, 1993). Specifically, the ability to generate 
alternative hypotheses and hypothesis-testing strategies is likely to be 
hampered (Dougherty & Harbison, 2007; Dougherty & Hunter, 2003; 
Thomas et al., 2008). In an experimental study, Ask and Granhag (2005) 
found that time-pressure made detectives more selective toward hypothesis-
consistent information, less able to generate alternative explanations of 
criminal evidence, and more persistent in their initial belief regarding a crime-
vignette. According to Klein and Hoffmann (1993), can expert decision-
makers perform at high levels despite time-pressure. Alison, Doran, Long, 
Power, and Humphrey (2013) tested this notion in a study of English 
detectives. They found that time-pressure reduced hypothesis generation in a 
computer-based rape investigative scenario and level of professional 
experience did not moderate the effects. An explanation for this discrepancy 
in findings might be differences in task composition amongst the two 
studies. In some tasks (eg. in sports or in rescue operations) it is probably 
acceptable not to explicitly consider all alternatives and simply choose the 
one the expert there and then recognizes as right (Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 
1981). Moreover, being an expert does not necessarily mean that one’s 
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decisions are always correct (Lipshitz, Klein, Orasanu, & Salas, 2001). If you 
are an expert football player this is probably acceptable because to loosing a 
match is part of the game. However, when dealing with more sensitive and 
critical tasks such as brain surgery or homicide investigations – one mistake 
is one too many (Ericsson, Prietula, & Cokely, 2007; Weiser et al., 2010). 
 Motivation. Another central aspect of human biases is the extent to 
which a phenomenon is driven by ‘hot’ motivational forces as opposed to 
‘colder’ cognitive mechanisms (Kunda, 1990). It has long been recognized 
that human behaviour is largely motivated by goals, and that goals can have a 
strong influence on cognitive processes (Kruglanski, 1996; Kunda, 1990). 
The social environment is an important source of goal activation (Klein & 
Kunda, 1993). The mere observation of another individual’s behaviour might 
automatically trigger an inference of which goal the individual is pursuing 
(Moskowitz & Grant, 2009), which in turn makes observers more likely to 
strive towards the same goal (Aarts, Gollwitzer, & Hassin, 2004). It seems 
people generally have little conscious insight into the cognitive processes that 
regulate goal activation. For example, Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, 
Barndollar, and Trötschel (2001) found that a sublime priming of a 
cooperation goal made participants behave more altruistically. Likewise, non-
conscious goal activation has been found to predict both memory 
performance (Dijksterhuis, Aarts, Bargh, & van Knippenberg, 2000) and 
creativity (Förster, Friedman, Butterbach, & Sassenberg, 2005; Hassin, Aarts, 
& Ferguson, 2005). As mentioned, criminal investigation is highly goal-
directed, although one may debate how to best define its ultimate goal (e.g., 
successful prosecution, solving the crime, punishing the offender) (Maguire, 
2008). In a series of experiments, Ask and colleagues have demonstrated 
how different forms of motivation like emotions (Ask & Granhag, 2007a; 
Ask & Pina, 2011), efficiency norms (Ask, Granhag, et al., 2011) and prior 
suspicion (Ask et al., 2008; Ask, Reinhard, et al., 2011; Marksteiner et al., 
2011) significantly hampered participants’ ability to generate alternative 
explanations of criminal evidence in a murder case scenario. As pointed out 
by Ask, Granhag, et al. (2011): “this strong normative emphasis on efficiency 
is likely to turn the social work environment into a chronic source of 
activation of efficiency goals, at the expense of more time-consuming 
accuracy goals” (p.548). Moskowitz and Grant (2009) found evidence for 
significant variation in cognitive performance when individuals were tested 
across different stages of goal-directed behaviour. Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, 
and Steller (1990) named these stages the pre-decision, the pre-action, the 
action, and the post-action phases. Each phase is characterized by distinct 
tasks, and engaging in these tasks produces typical mind-sets that facilitate 
task completion. Hence, deliberating over which goals to pursue and 
planning the implementation of set goals leads to different cognitive 
orientations (i.e., deliberative and implemental mind-sets, respectively). 
Gollwitzer (1990) observed that the deliberative mind-set leads to a relatively 
		 34 
accurate and impartial analysis of information about the feasibility and 
desirability of possible goals, whereas the implemental mind-set promotes an 
optimistic and partial analysis of such information. Moreover, the 
deliberative mind-set is associated with open-mindedness, whereas the 
implemental mind-set is characterized by closed-mindedness. Translated to 
an investigative setting, it would appear that detectives are better equipped to 
perform an impartial search for and analysis of investigative information 
before (i.e., in a deliberative mind-set), as opposed to after (i.e., in an 
implemental mind-set), a decision has been made to arrest someone or build 
a case against a particular suspect. As described by Stelfox and Pease (2005), 
a particular challenge when investigating complex crime is to resist the 
premature transition from entertaining alternative explanations (i.e., 
deliberation) to building a case in support of the chosen alternative (i.e., 
implementation). Although an investigation with potential for prosecution 
must at some point start building a case against a particular suspect, doing so 
too early may be hazardous, as evidenced by numerous miscarriages of 
justice. How different investigative settings, decisions, actions and levels of 
motivational activation might correspond with Gollwitzer’s theory of 
deliberative and implemental mind-sets has to the author’s knowledge not 
been studied before. Hence, the present thesis will explore the applicability 
of the theory to complex investigations and experimentally test to what 
extent changes in mind-sets can predict detectives’ judgements and decision-
making.  
 
Consequences of Heuristics and Biases in the Criminal Justice 
System 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) noted that the effects of confirmation bias 
effects could extend to the legal system insofar as “beliefs concerning the 
likelihood of […] the guilt of a defendant” could impact judicial decision-
making (p. 1124). In line with their prediction, a growing body of literature 
has identified a number of ways in which such biases can pervade the entire 
chain of justice from eyewitnesses (Hasel & Kassin, 2009; Loftus & 
Ketcham, 1991) to detectives (Ask & Alison, 2010; Gudjonsson, 1995; 
Meissner & Kassin, 2002), forensic experts (Dror, 2011; Dror, Péron, Hind, 
& Charlton, 2005), jurors (Charman, Gregory, & Carlucci, 2009; Georges, 
Wiener, & Keller, 2013), and professional judges (Granhag, Strömwall, & 
Hartwig, 2005; Hasel & Kassin, 2009). In sum, this might lead to a chain-
reaction amongst all actors involved in the criminal justice process, denoted 
by Dror (2012) as the “biased snowball effect”. Likewise, Findley and Scott 
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(2006), describe this as a form of systemic ‘tunnel-vision’ created through a 
“compendium of common heuristics and logical fallacies,” to which we are 
all susceptible.  Ultimately, this leads actors in the Criminal Justice System to 
“focus on a suspect, select and filter the evidence that will ‘build a case’ for 
conviction, while ignoring or suppressing evidence that points away from 
guilt” (p. 292). Likewise, Gould, Carrano, Leo, and Young (2013) describe 
how ‘tunnel-vision’ may cause a system-breakdown in the criminal justice 
process, by impeding the hierarchical and independent testing of evidence 
meant to take place in the pre-court and the in-court processes (Diesen, 
2000; Hastie & Dawes, 2010). Gould et al. (2013) connect tunnel vision with 
the concept of escalation of commitment (also called sunk cost effect, see 
eg., Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Lai, 1999) to 
explain why entrenchment of beliefs occur even when strong contradictory 
evidence has emerged:  
 
As more resources – money, time, and emotions – are 
placed into a narrative involving a suspect, the actors involved 
are less willing or able to process negative feedback that refutes 
their conclusions. Instead, actors want to devote additional 
resources in order to recoup their original investment. As a 
result, evidence that points away from a suspect is ignored or 
devalued, and latent errors are overlooked. At this point, the 
police are working to rule in rather than rule out the suspect, 
and prosecutors have moved from ‘inspection’ mode to ‘selling’ 
mode. (pp. 86–87)  
 
Interestingly, however, it is still debated whether the overall effect of 
heuristics and biases are productive or unproductive in the criminal justice 
system (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999; Gilovich et al., 2002; Mikels, Maglio, 
Reed, & Kaplowitz, 2011). Snook and Cullen (2008) have argued that tunnel-
vision in criminal investigation is not necessarily harmful. They state that: 
“Perhaps tunnel vision is used in every case, but only a very small percentage 
of these result in wrongful convictions’ (p. 92). Moreover, they argue that 
there is no empirical evidence for the claim that heuristics and biases are the 
underlying cause of miscarriages of justice. While Snook and Cullen might be 
right when arguing that building a better heuristic capacity amongst 
detectives represents more of a solution than a problem (Wright, 2013), it is 
established ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ that cognitive bias and tunnel vision 
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pose a serious threat to the universal principles of fair trial (e.g., Ask & 
Alison, 2010; Eerland & Rassin, 2012; Fraser-Mackenzie et al., 2013; Kassin 
et al., 2010; Kassin et al., 2013; Leo, 2008; Rassin, 2010; Rassin, Eerland, & 
Kuijpers, 2010). 
As noted by both Glöckner and Engel (2013) and Simon (2011), 
‘coherence-based reasoning3’, of which tunnel vision is an expression, may 
limit the ‘diagnostic value’ of evidence and seriously distort the reliability of 
the criminal justice process. Preferences used in decision-making are not, and 
should not, be fixed as assumed by classic theories of rational choice. Ideally, 
(legal) decision-makers should be flexible, creative and adaptive throughout 
the entire process, since the reconstruction of preferences seems to be the 
natural outcome of the very process of decision-making (Janis & Mann, 
1977; Montgomery, 1983; Russo, Medvec, & Meloy, 1996).  
Major crime investigations are highly complex and critical thinking 
operations (Innes & Brookman, 2013; Pennington & Hastie, 1992) and 
hence cannot be left to heuristics alone. The central question is therefore not 
which mode of thinking should be used, but rather how one more 
deliberately and functionally can move between them (Milkman, Chugh, & 
Bazerman, 2009). In order to achieve this, one needs situational awareness 
coupled with strict guidance such as education, methods, procedures, reviews 
and guiding policies (Graham, 2004; Jones et al., 2008; Weiser et al., 2010). A 
systematic development of a universally recognized professional standards 
and expertise building on scientific knowledge might be one step in that 
direction.   
 
EXPERIENCE AND EXPERTISE 
 
How individuals process information, and which decision strategies they use 
can be related to domain specific expertise. There is a large body of research 
on what makes someone an expert (e.g., Benner, 1984; Chi et al., 1981; 
Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 2005; Dror, 2011; Einhorn, 1974; Ericsson et al., 2007; 
Feltovich et al., 1984; Hunt, 2006; Klein & Hoffmann, 1993; Larkin, 
McDermott, Simon, & Simon, 1980).  
																																																								
3 In plain words; ‘use what fits and ignore the rest’. For example, are adversarial court systems based on a 
tradition where the prosecutor takes a stand about the accused’s guilt prior to the trial. During the trial he 
will try to convince the judge and the jury to focus on the evidence witch is coherent with guilt while the 
defence do the opposite.  
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Experts can have different degrees of expertise and several classification 
systems of levels of expertise have been proposed (eg., Benner, Tanner, & 
Chesla, 1992; Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 2005; Shanteau, 1988). Shanteau (1988) 
suggests three levels of decision-making expertise. Naïve decision-makers are 
at the lowest level of expertise and have little understanding of their field. 
For example, in the detective field, police students who have acquired some 
knowledge about the job, but have not yet practiced or applied the 
knowledge in real-life situations. Novice decision-makers are at the medium 
level of expertise. They have gained some knowledge and experience as 
operational police officers, but have as yet not specialised themselves in 
criminal investigation. At the top level are expert decision-makers who have 
reached the highest level of proficiency in their field. In the domain of 
criminal investigation, specialised detectives with high levels of both 
education and practical experience such as senior homicide detectives are an 
example of expert decision-makers. Likewise, Benner (1984) plots an 
individual professional progression through a series of five levels: novice, 
advanced beginner, competent, proficient, and expert. Novice practitioners 
follow basic procedural rules and do generally not move outside them, and 
competence develops as a result of substantial practical experience. 
Proficiency, in turn, is characterized by the acquisition of personal rules to 
formulate plans and by a reliance on intuitive decision-making. Finally, 
expertise is characterized by a fluid performance that happens unconsciously, 
automatically, and no longer depends on explicit knowledge.  
Expert decision-makers are generally said to outperform novices in 
practical diagnostic tasks (Benner, 1984; Benner et al., 1992; Dreyfus & 
Dreyfus, 2000). Although it is difficult to compare measures of expertise 
across domains (Ericsson, 2006), research within various fields of decision-
making has shown that experts and novices think and solve problems in 
somewhat different ways (Ross, Shafer, & Klein, 2006). As compared with 
novices, experts tend to have better perceptual skills (Klein & Hoffmann, 
1993) and richer schemata (Rouse & Morris, 1986). Experts also possess 
greater tacit knowledge in specific domains (Crandall, Kyne, Miltello, & 
Klein, 1992). Moreover, the thought processes of experts reveal more 
complex and sophisticated representations of problems; experts devote 
proportionately more time to determining how to represent a problem, but 
they spend proportionately less time in executing solutions (Ross, Battaglia, 
Phillips, Domeshek, & Lussier, 2003).  
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Benner’s and Dreyfus’ models of expertise have been criticized by a 
number of scholars for failing to specify any limitations or objective criteria 
for testing presumed expertise (English, 1993; Rolf, 2004). Terms like 
‘expertise’ and ‘intuition4’ do not have much operational value if they cannot 
be described, measured, or compared (Rudge, 1992). Meyer and Booker 
(2001) define an expert as: “a person who has background in the subject area 
and is recognized by his or her peers or those conducting the study as 
qualified to answer questions” (p. 3). Hence, the definition and identification 
of expertise is not always an objective and straightforward task (Ericsson et 
al., 2007). So far there are no established standards for the authorisation of 
detective expertise, hence this thesis must resort to indirect and relative 
measures such as years of experience, formal qualifications, recognition 
among peers, etc. (see, Chi et al., 1981). Most definitions of general expertise 
are in agreement that true expertise cannot be achieved without extensive 
periods of education, deliberate practice, or a combination of both (Germain 
& Enrique Ruiz, 2009). In most domains of expertise, an estimate of 10 years 
of experience, or 10,000 hours of deliberate practice, is considered to be a 
minimum (Ericsson et al., 2007). Such a minimum requirement will be used 
as an operationalisation of expertise in the present thesis. 
 As mentioned, experts are thought to have a better sense of what 
information is most relevant to handle the task at hand. Critical to this 
characteristic is selectivity. Selectivity is based on the attribution of 
differential importance and is a means of task adaptation due to, for example, 
limited cognitive capacity (Koriat et al., 1980). According to Chi, Feltovich, 
and Glaser (1981), expertise involves learning which information is most 
critical and which is more peripheral or even superfluous. Novices without 
this knowledge are therefore more prone to neglect certain key information 
or over-sample less important information. This knowledge is critical for 
directing attention and for the structuring of information in the perception 
process, making that process much more efficient, particularly in situations 
where there is time-pressure. Thus, expertise may moderate the effect of 
time pressure on decision quality through more effective selectivity. In 
addition, individuals are thought to use different strategies in high time-
pressure situations compared to low time-pressure situations. Crego and 
Spinks (1997) suggest that police officers’ use of decision strategies often 
depends on an automated and sometimes unconscious assessment of the 																																																								
4 Intuition can be defined as something that is known or understood without proof or evidence (Merriam-
Webster's Learner's Dictionary, 2016) 
		 39 
available time. In situations of low time pressure, individuals are thought to 
use analytical strategies where options are compared, whereas in situations of 
high time pressure, individuals are thought to use time-saving recognition 
primed strategies where there are stored patterns of pre-programmed 
responses (Flin & Arbuthnot, 2002). Furthermore, recognition of primed 
strategies is thought to be heavily influenced by experience. For example, 
Calderwood, Klein and Crandall (1988) found that the performance of 
experienced chess players did not decrease under time-pressure; however, 
performance did decrease in less experienced chess-players under time-
pressure. The recognition primed decision model (RPDM) states that when it 
comes to time-pressured decisions individuals rely on their experience. Over 
time, people encounter many situations and from these will develop a set of 
prototypical situations, or schemas, in memory. This prototype is a cognitive 
package that includes the type of situation, what to expect from the situation 
(expectancies), suitable goals, typical courses of action (COAs), and relevant 
cues. According to Alison et al. (2007) the ability of investigators to 
recognize critical cues is likely to be heavily dependent on experience. 
Hence, compared to less experienced individuals, are experts thought 
to both have a better sense of what is the most relevant information and how 
to act on this in situ – (Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff, 2007; Hogarth, 
2001; Jacobson, Gruenbaum, & Markus, 2012; Klein, Calderwood, & 
Clinton-Cirocco, 1986; Smith & Aamodt, 1997). This competence is thought 
to be critical for directing attention and taking in and classifying information 
in diagnostic tasks, by making the process more efficient. To illustrate, 
Weber, Böckenholt, Hilton, and Wallace (1993) found a positive link 
between years of medical experience and physicians’ ability to generate 
relevant diagnostic hypotheses. Similar findings were reported by Stolper et 
al. (2010), who found that experienced general (medical) practitioners 
produced more accurate diagnoses than their less experienced colleagues. 
Other research suggests that the speed with which initial hypotheses are 
generated is a striking feature of expertise (Klein et al., 1986). Furthermore, 
there is evidence that the earlier a good hypothesis-set is created – the more 
predictive it is of the quality of the diagnosis (Joseph & Patel, 1990). 
Professional experience is not necessarily always beneficial to 
diagnostic reasoning, however. In a study of early diagnostic hypotheses 
generation, Sisson et al. (1991) found that medical students generated more 
hypotheses than experienced physicians, and this finding was consistent 
across scenarios. Furthermore, experienced physicians’ hypotheses were 
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found to be more general (shallower) than the students; however, the two 
groups did not differ in terms of the breadth of their hypotheses. Neither 
group were able to name all of the diagnostic categories that logically should 
have been included in their diagnoses. Sisson et al. assume that the fact that 
experienced physicians generate less specific hypotheses may reflect an 
unconsciously learned approach or an intuitive evolution in reasoning.  
The degree to which differences in professional experience may 
influence detectives’ decision making has not been given much attention in 
previous research (Ask & Alison, 2010; Stelfox, 2007; Wright, 2008). A few 
interesting studies are however, available. According to Alison, Barrett and 
Crego (2007) the ability of investigators to recognize critical cues is likely to 
depend heavily on experience. In support of this, Wright (2008) found that 
highly experienced detectives performed better than less experienced officers 
in an intuitive crime-scene classification task. On the other hand, in a recent 
study of English police officers, Alison et al. (2013) found no significant 
evidence for a positive relationship between professional experience and the 
ability to generate the highest number of investigative hypotheses in a 
simulated rape-crime scenario. However, as acknowledge by the authors 
themselves; the mere number of generated hypotheses may not be indicative 
of expertise per se. True proficiency may surface only when also the quality of 
the generated hypotheses is taken into account, which was not done in their 
study. The number of hypotheses generated is only of interest as long as they 
all are truly diagnostic and relevant to the data at hand.  
A further desirable indicator of decision-making expertise is the ability 
to actively label and counteract the biasing influence from contextual factors 
(Dror, Charlton, & Peron, 2006; Lieberman, Rock, Halvorson, & Cox, 2015). 
As shown above, the available research has demonstrated several sources of 
contextual bias in criminal investigations, including time-pressure, emotional 
involvement, culture and occupational norms (e.g., Ask & Granhag, 2007a, 
2007b; Ask, Granhag, et al., 2011). The degree to which detective expertise 
might act as a safeguard against such biases has not yet been systematically 
investigated. It will be addressed in the current research.  
 
England and Norway: Different Paths to Detective Expertise  
In the past, police leaders seemingly held the view that the investigation of a 
crime required few skills in addition to the training required for general 
police work. In their 1919 revision of the police forces in England and 
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Wales, the Desborough committee 5  labelled the investigative task as 
something rather trivial that could be learned on the beat, without the need 
for particular training (Critchley, 1978). This view was reinforced by research 
conducted in the late 1970s and early 1980s, which concluded that crimes 
were solved primarily because members of the public provided the police 
with key information in the early stages of the investigation. With the 
absence of such information, it was seen as unlikely that the crime would be 
solved by additional police efforts (Greenwood et al., 1977). The implication 
drawn from these studies was that because crime-solving heavily depends on 
information provided by the public, changes in police activity or an increase 
in resources would make little difference in investigative outcomes. Rising 
levels of crime in the 1980s and 1990s, coupled with a decreasing number of 
crimes detected suggested deterioration in the effectiveness of crime 
investigation, an activity that many people saw as on of the the primary role 
of the police (Audit Commission, 1993). Added to this, police incompetence 
and poor supervision and management of major investigations had been 
exposed in public enquiries since the late 1970’s (Irving & Hilgendorf, 1980; 
Morris, 2007). The first Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (1978–
1984) examined the current practice of interrogation in England and Wales 
and reported a widespread abuse of police powers, outright corruption and 
overreliance on confession evidence. The Commission resulted in the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act (1984) setting out a core framework of police 
powers and safeguards around stop and search, arrest, detention, 
investigation, identification and interviewing detainees (Irving & 
Dunningham, 1993). Around the same time, the so-called Byford Report 
(1982) reviewed the flawed investigations of the murders committed by Peter 
Sutcliffe, more commonly known as “the Yorkshire Ripper”. Sir Byford 
found that the six-year enquiry, involving several different English police 
forces, suffered from difficulties with the operational management such as 
organising and processing the vast amounts of information. This 
shortcoming was accompanied by or led to poor decision-making relating to 
the early (wrongful) elimination of Peter Sutcliffe as a suspect.  The same 
problems were later documented in the so-called Shipman inquiry into the 
numerous killings carried out by Dr. Harold Shipman in the North of 
England (Roycroft, Brown, & Innes, 2013). These problems led to the 																																																								
5As a response to the police strikes of 1918-19 the government appointed the Desborough Committee, 
which recommended an increase in police wages, and the creation of a uniform profession, a nationally 
homogenous group of men (and later women) who could be trained to do the job without intervention 
from local government or other intervening 'democratic' bodies (Sherman, 2001). 
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development and introduction of the computer software HOLMES (Home 
Office Large Major Enquiry System) into major incident rooms in England 
and Wales (Doney, 1990; Harris, 2008). From a psychological perspective, 
such decision support systems are indispensable, as they might counteract 
the well-known problem of information overload, which quickly appears as 
large quantities of data accumulate (Bryant, 2009). Apart from the use of 
computers, did these first documented observations of poor decision making 
seemingly have little impact on the responses that followed in the British 
police organization; the research and development that actually took place 
after the first Royal Commission mainly concerned procedural law, the 
introduction of computer systems, and improved methods for investigative 
interviewing (Williamson, 2007).  
The next British Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (1993) focused 
even more on deficits in the supervision of criminal investigations, and for 
the first time investigators’ decision-making was mentioned explicitly. Barrie 
Irving, again involved in the Commission, argued for the need to improve 
officers’ reasoning and decision making by challenging the “common sense” 
about criminals and crimes, and the “working rules about causation, about 
suspicion and guilt … [which] are passed from experienced to inexperienced 
officers” (Irving & Dunningham, 1993, p. 17). These conclusions were 
supported by other studies under the same commission conducted by 
Maguire and Norris (1992) and Baldwin and Moloney (1992), who found that 
although new legislation was in place and all suspect interviews were now 
being recorded, very little had changed for the better. The researchers found 
“no evidence of formal or informal quality control systems designed to 
minimise error” (Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, 1993, p. 20). To 
address these shortcomings, the commission recommended a number of 
changes, including an audit of on-going cases; increased disclosure of 
documents to the defence lawyer; an overhaul of the detective training; a 
clearer distinction between the role of general police officers and detectives; 
increased use of the HOLMES system; formal debriefs; and the introduction 
of policy files in all major inquiries, documenting the outset of the 
investigation, its lines of enquiry, any critical decisions made, and any 
restrictions made due to limited resources. This wave of continuous critique 
climaxed with the flawed Scotland Yard investigation into the death of 18-
year-old Stephen Lawrence who was stabbed to death at a bus stop in South 
London in 1993. To this date, only two of the presumed five perpetrators 
have been prosecuted for this murder. The aftermath of this scandal is still 
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continuing and the Scotland Yard was not only held as incompetent, but also 
corrupted, and charged with ‘institutional racism’ (Macpherson, 1999; 
McGrory & Treacy, 2012; Roycroft et al., 2013).  
Public trust in the British police service was now seriously threatened. To 
address this, a Government White paper was published in 2001: “Policing a 
New Century; A Blueprint for Reform”(Home Office, 2001). The paper 
advocated a number of radical reforms to policing which included: “the 
police need a clear and common understanding of the theory and practice of 
investigation, detective staff must be well versed in both and have the 
training and the experience to put it to the best use, scientific and 
technological advances need to be exploited to the full” (p. 41). Following 
this, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the British Police 
Service, have attempted to make up for the dramatic fall in public trust and 
confidence. The Home Office established their own research series in the 
early 1990s, and ACPO introduced of a series of manuals seeking to 
implement a new underpinning for criminal investigations in England and 
Wales (ACPO, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2007, 2012). This is clearly illustrated by the 
following excerpt from the Murder Investigation Manual (ACPO, 2000), 
which presents itself as: 
 
“constructed around a model of murder investigation developed within 
the police service, but based upon a scientific model. The model fully 
recognises the core activities which occur during the course of a murder 
investigation, whilst promoting the principles that all investigations 
should be:  
• intelligence led  
• underpinned by research and analysis 
• managed through the application of theory and logic 
• dynamic and capable of rapid response. 
 
Importantly, the model not only describes the investigative process, but is 
seeks to discipline the mind of the lead detective - the Senior Investigating 
Officer (SIO). It is suggested that if SIOs can train their minds to manage 
murder investigations using the model, the outcome will be an ethical and 
professionally led investigation” (ACPO, 2000, p. 15).  
In a seminal study of the personal qualities required to succeed as an 
SIO in England and Wales, Smith and Flanagan (2000) identified 22 core 
skills. They clustered these skills into three groups: (a) ‘investigative ability’, 
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seen as reacting to incoming information to devise and prioritize enquiries; 
(b) ‘knowledge levels’, which relate to what the SIO must know (e.g., the 
legal points that must be proved); and (c) ‘management skills’, which include 
competencies with human and other resources. Unfortunately, were these 
findings never subjected to any further methodological conceptualisation or 
testing based on experimental ‘what-works’ research. Nevertheless, there has 
been a strong and lasting drive to improve the competence of all police 
officers and staff tasked with conducting investigations through the 
introduction of the Professionalising Investigation Programme (‘PIP’, 
McGrory & Treacy, 2012). The PIP aims to provide four different levels of 
competence for investigators: Level 1 (patrol constable), Level 2 (dedicated 
investigators; e.g., CID officers and specialist investigations such as child 
abuse investigation), Level 3 (operational command, Senior Investigating 
Officers), and Level 4 (strategic command). The programme was launched in 
2005 and implemented in the police service by 2008. The SIO constitutes the 
top operational role in this system and as outlined below decision-making is 
one out of five defined personal qualities of an accredited SIO (ACPO, 
2010):   
 
[The SIO]...gathers, verifies and assesses all appropriate and 
available information to gain an accurate understanding of 
situations. Considers a range of possible options, evaluating 
evidence and seeking advice where appropriate. Makes clear, 
timely, justifiable decisions, reviewing these as necessary. Balances 
risks, costs and benefits, thinking about the wider impact of 
decisions. Exercises discretion and applies professional 
judgement, ensuring actions and decisions are proportionate and 
in the public interest. (para. 1) 
 
Moreover, full-scale exercises in so-called Hydra decision-making simulation 
suites are compulsory at all PIP levels, both operative and strategic. Hydra is 
a high-fidelity immersive simulation training system designed to facilitate the 
development of operational decision-making skills, cooperation, and review 
(Eyre, Crego, & Alison, 2008). The Hydra concept is specifically tailored to 
develop the strategic and critical decision making skills of SIOs (Alison & 
Crego, 2008; Crego & Harris, 2002). As a part of the reforms, all major crime 
enquiries are subject to the requirement of documenting decision logs, policy 
files, and written reviews (ACPO, 2012). The implementation of the PIP 
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programme was reviewed by Flanagan (2008) who concluded that it had 
established a body of knowledge for investigative practice and delivered a 
recognizable framework to professionalize the investigative process which 
had been previously absent. According to Flanagan, PIP provided the 
opportunity to “deliver the right people, with the right skills in the right place 
at the right time” (Flanagan, 2008, p. 6).  What this means in practice is not 
clear and there is no body of evidence to support the notion or the 
framework. 
Although none of these programmes, guidelines, or documents 
explicitly mention abductive logic, sense-making, or any other scientifically 
recognised generic diagnostic method or model, the totality of the 
recommendations in the official guidelines might have lead the detectives 
into a more thorough, accurate and deliberate processing of information. 
Somewhat paradoxically, do the non-scientific framework from England and 
Wales seem to bridge the gap between research and practice better than any 
other known official policy in this domain. An example of this is the findings 
from Jones et al. (2008) who in their inspection of major crime cases found 
documented awareness for the notion that the SIOs in murder investigations 
should document all relevant hypotheses identified in the case, and the 
inquiry should seek to disprove each one: the remaining one is probably the 
strongest theory. This routine is accompanied with live case audit meant to 
ensure and document the recommended processes are actually followed, but 
also to evaluate the decision-making rationale and the examination of the 
process of formulating, proving and disproving hypotheses. It is likely that 
these combined initiatives to improve detectives’ accountability and 
operational decision-making have improved the overall quality of 
investigative work in England and Wales. However, this assumption has 
never been scientifically tested in relation to criminal investigation. If fact, 
the available research from the Home Office Research Series show that there 
has been no research on investigative decision-making since the research 
series first was established in 1992.  
 Despite a number of high profile cases of serious miscarriage of 
justice in Scandinavia and Europe at large (Fahsing & Rachlew, 2009; 
Granhag et al., 2013; Persak, 2014; Rachlew, 2009), no comparable change of 
policy towards standardised investigative methods, operational procedures, 
and detectives’ professional roles has yet been implemented in Norway or 
any other Scandinavian country (Fahsing, 2013; Hald, 2011; Rachlew, 2009; 
Riksadvokaten, 2015). Although the Norwegian Police University College 
		 46 
offers a wide range of different further education programmes within 
criminal investigation, none of these are compulsory to become a full-time 
detective (Politidirektoratet, 2013). Thus, the traditional belief in an 
omnipotent police officer still seems to be alive in Norway and in most other 
European countries (Dale, 1994; Fahsing, 2013). Furthermore, there are no 
standardised procedures to ensure documentation of investigation plans, 
critical decisions, or live auditing (Politidirektoratet, 2013; Riksadvokaten, 
2015). On the other hand, all Norwegian Police officers must undertake a 
three-year full-time bachelor in policing before they can apply for a position 
in the service. This system speaks to a robust police generalist, who is 
expected to engage in quite complex tasks without further formal 
specialisation.  
From the above it is evident that the paths to detective expertise are 
quite different in the two jurisdictions. The British initiatives comprise a 
number of practical steps from documentation of information and decisions 
to case reviews, which may serve as effective countermeasures against biased 
decisions and as positive drivers for increased accuracy (see also e.g., Ask, 
2006; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). To the author’s knowledge, such detailed and 
comprehensive official guidelines on detectives’ decision-making do not exist 
outside England and Wales, and most certainly not in any of the 
Scandinavian countries. The degree to which such differences in official 
policy might moderate detectives’ decision-making remains to be 
systematically tested. In order to better guide future practice and policy, 
should therefore changes in working procedures and specific suggestions 
from qualitative research be followed up with experimental research in order 
to facilitate continuous professional development and evidence-based 
practices (Sherman, 2001, 2015). There is strong reason to believe that such a 
framework and foundation will helpful to any detective – no matter where or 
when. This thesis seeks to provide an initial step in that direction. 
 
Is IQ a Predictor of Detective Performance? 
While motivation and continuous development are assumed to be the most 
important factors in the development of expertise (Ericsson et al., 2007), 
aptitude is also of crucial importance (Hunt, 2006). The current recruitment 
of detectives in Norway and England stems largely from the uniformed force 
and by use of feeble predictors such as reputation earned during patrolling 
and displayed motivation (Filstad, Dean, Fahsing, & Gottschalk, 2007; Innes, 
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2003; Morris, 2007). More precise and valid predictors of detectives’ skills are 
urgently needed. For what we know might the best detective candidate be 
sitting in a wheelchair with no chances of ever even being considered for a 
job in the police service.  
The degree to which individual differences, such as personality traits 
and cognitive ability, may influence detectives’ decision making has not been 
given much attention in previous research (Ask & Alison, 2010; Stelfox, 
2007; Wright, 2008). This is somewhat surprising, given that selection based 
on personal abilities is common in other areas of policing (e.g., recruitment 
for swat, covert, surveillance or protection officers). In a few studies, 
however, the role of individual differences among detectives has received 
some support (Alison et al., 2013; Ask & Granhag, 2005; Häkkänen, Ask, 
Kebbell, Alison, & Granhag, 2009; Salo & Allwood, 2011; Santtila, Korpela, 
& Häkkänen, 2004). For instance, Ask and Granhag (2005) found that 
experienced detectives with high levels of need for cognitive closure 
(NFC)—a cognitive trait reflecting a desire for clear-cut conclusions and 
avoidance of ambiguity (Hirt et al., 2004; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996)—
were less likely than their low-NFC peers to detect inconsistencies in the 
evidence gathering in a homicide case.  
Police organizations around the world face the challenge of selecting 
the applicants who will become the most successful. Their role gives them 
substantial authority, and therefore society expects police officers to behave 
according to certain standards both on and off the job. Hence, a battery of 
different selection methods is in use to identify the best candidates prior to 
recruitment and training. Commonly used tests include minimum 
qualification, interviews, cognitive ability tests, personality inventories, and 
physical ability tests (Aamodt, 2004). Criminal investigation is thought to be 
perhaps the most cognitive demanding of all police tasks.  For instance, the 
importance of intelligence to investigative work has been stressed by 
previous research into detectives (Maguire & Norris, 1992; O’Neill & Milne, 
2014) and in textbooks on criminal investigations (Osterburg & Ward, 2000). 
In other domains, cognitive ability has been found to relate to job 
performance by facilitating facts-acquisition, learning of procedures, problem 
solving, and job-specific rules (Motowildo, Borman, & Schmit, 1997). These 
capacities are thought to be important also in law enforcement selection 
(Ono, Sachau, Deal, Englert, & Taylor, 2011). 
Cognitive or mental ability is one of the most widely researched, 
applied, and also disputed psychological constructs (Baron, 1985; Weisberg 
		 48 
& Reeves, 2013). The U.S. Military was the first to apply large-scale testing of 
cognitive ability, assessing almost two million individuals during World War I 
(Mandler, 2007). Later, this sort of ‘intelligence testing’ developed into the 
dominant method for personnel selection in a wide range of public- and 
private-sector organisations (Hunter, 1986). The available research suggests 
that cognitive ability is a highly reliable predictor of overall job performance 
in many domains (Aamodt, 2004; Hirsh, Northrop, & Schmidt, 1986). 
Typically, in performance evaluation studies, cognitive ability accounts for 
about 25% of the variance in performance measures (Motowidlo, 2003; Ono 
et al., 2011).  
The crucial importance of cognitive abilities to criminal investigations 
has been stressed by previous research on detectives (e.g., Ask, 2006; Blair & 
Rossmo, 2010; Fahsing & Gottschalk, 2008; Maguire & Norris, 1992; O’Neill 
& Milne, 2014) and in a number of previous textbooks on criminal 
investigations (e.g., Cook & Tattersall, 2014; Hald & Rønn, 2013; Osterburg 
& Ward, 2000). Interestingly, however, in law enforcement settings, meta-
analyses done in the US show that cognitive ability tests have significantly 
lower predictive validity than for other occupational groups (Hirsh et al., 
1986; Ono et al., 2011). A meta-analysis of European samples revealed 
similar findings (Salgado et al., 2003). One explanation for the relatively weak 
relationship is the social and interactive nature of most law enforcement 
jobs. That is, personality, maturity, motivation, and interpersonal skills may 
have larger effects on officers’ job performance than cognitive ability (Hirsh 
et al., 1986; Twersky-Glasner, 2005). Previous studies of North-American 
police officers by Smith & Aamodt (1997) found a significant relationship 
between job performance and age, experience, motivation, and level of 
education. The study did not control for general cognitive ability though. In a 
survey of British police officers, O'Neill (2011) found no correlations 
between Ravens Standard Progressive Matrices—a measure of fluid 
intelligence—and objective and subjective measures of investigative success. 
This may seem somewhat surprising, but O’Neill used a correlational design 
based on self-reporting and official clearance rates which speaks for both 
vague and unstable performance measures.  
There are only a handful of published experimental, or quasi-
experimental, studies on how cognitive ability relates to detectives’ 
judgments and decision-making. In the already mentioned study, including 
50 Swedish detectives, Ask and Granhag (2005) found that need for 
cognitive closure (NFCC) moderated confirmation bias when evaluating the 
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strength of the evidence against a prime suspect in a fictitious homicide case. 
Investigators found to be high (vs. low) in NFCC were somewhat more likely 
to identify exonerating information when it confirmed their hypothesis, but 
somewhat less likely when the information disconfirmed their hypothesis. In 
a later study of Dutch police officers, Rassin (2010) failed to replicate these 
findings, but a self-constructed scale of confirmation proneness (called the 
Test Strategy Scale) was associated with ‘blindness’ to investigative 
alternatives in a significant way. Another reason for this seemingly blurred 
picture might be the fact that although lateral thinking, decision-making, 
inferences and creativity has been defined crucial for individual job 
performance in criminal investigations (Canter & Youngs, 2003; Fahsing & 
Gottschalk, 2008; Irvine & Dunningham, 1993; Smith & Flanagan, 2000) –
neither of these constructs are defined in detail or with consensus in the 
literature (Alison et al., 2007; Ask & Alison, 2010). There is no doubt as to if 
critical thinking skills are important to become an expert detective. However 
a crucial question t remains; what type of cognitive abilities will promote 
investigative thinking and how can these abilities be tested in a reliable way? 
 A related question is to what degree cognitive ability promotes rational 
thinking in real-life decision-making. Numerous studies have found positive 
correlations between scores on tests of cognitive ability and resistance to 
typical decision-making biases, such as overconfidence (Stanovich & West, 
2000), statistical reasoning errors (Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, & Kunda, 1983), 
framing errors (Stanovich & West, 1998), and hindsight bias (Stanovich & 
West, 2000). Bruine de Bruin et al. (2007) found that behavioural decision-
making tasks such as estimating of potential health risks were related to high 
scores on modified versions of the Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices 
and the Nelson-Denny Reading Comprehension subtest. On the other hand, 
these relationships are somewhat mitigated by the fact that just as many 
studies have found that a number of other undesirable effects of the 
heuristics and biases seem to operate independent of intelligence when tested 
in between-subjects designs (Stanovich, 2009; Stanovich & West, 1997; 
Stanovich & West, 2000, 2008; Stanovich, West, & Toplak, 2013). Moreover 
have tasks connected with ‘scientific’ and probabilistic reasoning such as 
covariation detection, hypothesis testing, disjunctive reasoning, and 
denominator neglect not been found to support a claim for a strong 
relationship between intelligence tests and operational rationality (e.g., Bruine 
de Bruin et al., 2007; Frederick, 2005; Stanovich & West, 2000). Hence, 
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Stanovich and West (2014) conclude that a number of rational thinking tasks 
seem quite dissociated from IQ.  
The notion that IQ tests do not measure all key human cognitive 
faculties is not new; critics of intelligence tests have been making that point 
for years (Neisser et al., 1996; Sternberg, 2002). The degree to which 
intelligence test scores are correlated with overall giftedness, practical 
intelligence and rational thinking is debated (Baron, 1985; Chomsky, 1972; 
Gardner, 2011; Stanovich & West, 2014). Taken together, the literature 
shows a need for a move towards a more nuanced and theory driven 
application of cognitive ability tests (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Cokely & 
Kelley, 2009). Nevertheless, as already mentioned do proponents of such 
tests cite the abundance of research demonstrating that cognitive ability tests 
are excellent predictors of performance in a wide variety of jobs (Cut-e, 
2016; Hunter, 1986).  Consequently, are a wide range cognitive ability tests 
commonly used in law enforcement selection world-wide (Aamodt, 2004; 
Annell, Lindfors, & Sverke, 2015; Lough & Treuer, 2013). This category of 
tests includes a wide variety of assessments ranging from general intelligence 
to combinations of specific aspects of cognitive ability as reading, math, 
vocabulary, and logic. As noted above, are such tests used as a screening tool 
also by the Norwegian Police University College (DIFI, 2014) and the same 
tests are applied for recruitment in a variety of other professions (Cut-e, 
2016; Hunter, 1986; Ono et al., 2011). According to Aamodt (2014), this 
widespread use of cognitive ability tests in law enforcement selection is 
controversial both in light of the general critique of the relevance of IQ tests, 
and because cognitive ability tests tend to impact adversely on already 
marginalized socio-economic groups (See eg., Chomsky, 1972; Roth, Bevier, 
Bobko, Switzer, & Tyler, 2001).  
In recent years, applicants have even challenged the legality of cognitive 
ability tests based on the score needed to pass the test (Aamodt, 2014). That 
is, should the applicants with the highest scores always be given preference 
over people with lower scores? Twersky-Glasner (2005) notes that such 
assessment instruments do not necessarily tell us what police aptitude 
actually is, but tend to tell what a police aptitude is not. Furthermore, police 
aptitude is not necessarily the same as aptitude for detection.  
The bulk of research in the area is either descriptive (i.e., what types of 
instruments are used) or directed toward how such instruments may help 
detect potentially unfit candidates (Hogan & Kurtines, 1975). Because of the 
major consequences that follow when cognitive ability tests are used in the 
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recruitment of police, it is essential to conduct validation studies to ensure 
that the people who score high on these tests actually perform better on the 
job than those that do not. Until there is such evidence, the police selection 
procedure is largely about screening out ‘unsuccessful’ candidates (Twersky-
Glasner, 2005). Based on the above, there is clearly a reason to examine what 
exactly constitutes good decision-making in criminal investigations, and to 
what degree these can be predicted by individual-difference measures.  
In the specific context of investigative and diagnostic sense making, 
high capacity for logical reasoning should enable detectives to think of more 
investigative alternatives and make them more robust to irrelevant contextual 
influences (Hunter, 1986). As stated by Kahneman and Frederick (2002) 
“intelligent people are more likely to possess the relevant logical rules and 
also to recognize the applicability of these rules in particular situations. In the 
terms of the present analysis, high-IQ respondents benefit from relatively 
efficient System 2 operations6 that enable them to overcome erroneous 
intuitions when adequate information is available.” (p. 68). In the current 
thesis, this assumption will be examined. Specifically, the relationship 
between measures of inductive and deductive reasoning (administered as part 
of the selection procedure for the Norwegian Police University College) and 
individuals’ ability to generate relevant investigative hypotheses will be tested 
(Study III). 
 
SUMMARY OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
 
As illustrated above, there are a number of factors present in homicide 
detectives’ work environment that can bias their operational judgements and 
decisions.  Organisational knowledge of these factors, and awareness of the 
potential dangers in operational contexts, are the first steps toward effective 
countermeasures. Accordingly, Study I, which was an interview study, 
explored Norwegian and English homicide detectives’ views of critical 
factors related to judgements and decision-making in homicide 
investigations. Following this, Study II tested quasi-experimentally the degree 
to which policy-related differences across jurisdictions (Norway vs. England), 
in conjunction with the amount of professional experience, influenced the 																																																								
6 ‘System 2 operations’ - cognitive operations that typically are conscious, slower, effortful, and deliberately 
controlled.  	
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early diagnostic phases of detectives’ decision-making (i.e., investigative 
hypothesis generation). Using a similar design as Study II, Study III tested 
the degree to which a test of general cognitive ability, used in the selection 
process by the Norwegian Police University College, predicted investigative 
decision-making skills among police students.  
 
Study I 
The aim of Study I was to discover more about how experienced homicide 
detectives from England and Norway think about their own professional 
judgements and decision-making. A specific goal was to document their 
knowledge and awareness about their own inferential strategies and about 
what factors might influence these strategies. Specifically, we explored their 
views from the perspective of the Gollwitzer et al. (1990) theory of changing 
mind-sets in different phases of action and the potential application of this 
theory to complex investigations.   
A total of 35 experienced homicide investigators from Norway (n = 15) 
and the UK (n = 20) were interviewed to identify potential decisional 
‘tipping-points’—decisions that might put detectives in a goal directed mind-
set focused on verifying the guilt of a suspect—and situational or individual 
factors that relate to these decisions. In a content analysis of the interviews, 
two types of decisions were identified as typically recurring and potentially 
critical tipping-points: (1) decisions related to the process of naming, 
arresting, or charging of a suspect, and (2) decisions on main strategies (‘what 
to investigate’) and the identification and priority of investigative actions 
(‘how to investigate’) in the case. In response to open-ended questions all 
participants mentioned these two proposed decisional tipping-points. We 
also found that experienced detectives in both England and Norway seemed 
quite aware of many of the risk factors and obstacles working against optimal 
decision making during major criminal investigations. 10 individual factors 
(e.g., experience, education, expertise) and 14 situational factors (e.g., 
information availability, time-pressure, media-attention) were reported as 
related to the likelihood of unconscious and potentially negative shifts in 
homicide detectives’ mind-sets. Most of the factors reported as significant 
corresponded well with findings in both basic and applied decision-making 
research, such as the role of time-pressure (Ask & Granhag, 2007b; 
Bodenhausen, 1990; Svenson & Maule, 1993) excessive workload (Salo & 
Allwood, 2014), social stereotypes (Devine, 1989; Lindholm, 2005), pressure 
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from the public and media (Crego & Alison, 2004; Macpherson, 1999), and 
commitment to preceding decisions (Gollwitzer, 1990; Nickerson, 1998). 
These, and organizational pressures and team culture factors (Ask, Granhag, 
et al., 2011; Hofstede, 2001), were reported by more than 80% of the 
participants in response to open-ended questions. 
 
Discussion. It has previously been pointed out that police officers are 
typically uninformed about essential research findings on human cognition 
and cognitive biases (Stelfox & Pease, 2005). Although this may well be the 
case, the current findings point to the possibility that experienced detectives 
seem to develop lay notions which in many cases correspond well with the 
available research literature. The results of the current study provide support 
for the applicability of Gollwitzer’s (1990) theory of action phases in 
homicide investigations. British and Norwegian detectives consistently 
identified two specific types of investigative decisions—(a) decisions to 
identify, arrest, or charge a suspect, and (b) decisions on strategies, 
hypotheses and lines of inquiry likely to act as decisional tipping-points, i.e. 
trigger unconscious and narrowing shifts in mind-set. Although the two 
types of decisions were reported as distinct and separate, they are obviously 
related. One important aspect of this relationship which may be explored in 
future is temporal dynamics. For instance, the decision to arrest a suspect is 
very likely to proceed and force decisions on investigative strategies in a 
particular direction (i.e., focus on the suspect), because of the limited time 
frame during which the arrest can be sustained. Hence, many times these 
decisions are perhaps best seen as interlinked and mutually reinforcing, 
rather than separate and independent (see eg., Svenson, 1992). Moreover, 
because the current study used a purely explorative approach, our data does 
not permit any conclusions about the actual impact of these tipping-points. 
 
Study II 
The main purpose with Study II was to test and compare police officers’ 
ability to make high quality investigative decisions and to resist the influence 
of decisional tipping-points (see Study I). The process of investigation is 
complex and influenced by a number of stages and factors. The entire 
process from first suspicion-activating cue to the last note to the prosecutor 
is therefore very hard to reconstruct experimentally (Canter & Alison, 1999). 
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Hence, the present study focused on the early stages of the diagnostic 
process. A quasi-experiment compared experienced detectives and novice 
police officers from England and Norway—two countries with markedly 
different system for professional qualification. A total of 124 police officers 
took part in the study. They were recruited from four different professional 
groups: newly educated Norwegian police officers (n = 31), highly 
experienced Norwegian homicide detectives (n = 32), newly educated British 
police officers (n = 30), and highly experienced British homicide detectives 
accredited as Senior Investigating Officers (n = 31).  
Participants were presented with two vignettes describing cases where a 
person had gone missing, which could potentially be construed as homicide 
cases. The presence of decisional tipping-points (Study I), was manipulated 
by adding a sentence in the end of the vignette stating that an arrest had been 
made in the case. Hence, the experimental design was a 2 (Country: England 
vs. Norway) × 2 (Professional experience: experienced detective vs. novice) 
× 2 (Tipping point: absent vs. present) mixed factorial, with tipping point as 
within-participants factor. After reading each case, participants were asked to 
identify and write down all necessary and relevant investigative hypotheses 
and actions. They were not allowed to use any means of assistance and were 
under observation given 30 minutes to individually conclude on each case. 
The quality of participants’ responses were assessed using an exhaustive 
gold-standard list of plausible hypotheses and actions. The golden standard 
was created using a Delphi process (Hsu & Sandford, 2007; Linstone & 
Turoff, 1975) where a panel of 15 British and 15 Norwegian senior experts in 
homicide investigations were asked to identify all necessary investigative 
hypotheses and investigative actions through a accumulative and iterative 
process.  
There was no significant effect of the manipulated decisional tipping-
point on the number of generated gold-standard hypotheses or investigative 
actions, nor did the tipping-point factor interact with participants’ level of 
experience. However, a clear and significant pattern in the form of a Country 
× Experience interaction emerged. As can be seen in Table 1, the 
experienced officers from England significantly outperformed the other 
groups across all measures. The Norwegian bachelor educated novices, with 
only one year of professional experience, performed slightly better than the 
experienced Norwegian homicide detectives, and significantly outperformed 
their UK (novice) counterparts (see Table 1).  The information presented in 
the two vignettes did not allow for any real discrimination between the gold-
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standard hypotheses. Ideally, all of them should have been generated from 
the outset and tested on an equal basis. Nevertheless, all groups displayed a 
significant preference, t(124) = 43.63, p < .001., d =.63, for the crime-related 
hypotheses, kidnapping and murder (M = .52, SD = .22) compared with the 
non-criminal alternatives (M = .36, SD = .28). Only 3% of the experienced 
Norwegian homicide detectives produced all 6 non-criminal hypotheses in 
the two cases. In the vignette describing the disappearance of a young 
Kurdish girl, even the best performing professional group (accredited 
English SIO’s) generated less than 50% of the non-crime hypotheses 
including suicide, accident, or sudden illness.  
 
Table 1 
Mean Proportion of Generated Gold-Standard Hypotheses and Investigative Actions as a 
Function of Country, Experience, and Presence of Tipping Point  
 No tipping point  Tipping point 
Country and 
experience 
M SD  M SD 
 Gold-standard hypothesesa 
England      
    Novices .30 .19  .28 .13 
    Experienced .69 .25  .78 .25 
Norway      
   Novices .52 .23  .50 .23 
   Experienced .51 .24  .41 .21 
 Gold-standard investigative actionsb 
England      
   Novices .38 .11  .40 .13 
   Experienced .73 .14  .73 .13 
Norway      
   Novices .62 .15  .60 .14 
   Experienced .62 .13  .64 .13 
aValues represent the proportion of generated gold-standard hypotheses out of the 
possible maximum. bValues represent the proportion of generated gold-standard 
investigative actions out of the possible maximum. 
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Discussion. Overall, the more experienced participants generated more 
alternative explanations and investigative actions than did the less 
experienced police officers. A beneficial function of professional experience 
was, however, only observed among the English officers. Although we did 
not measure decision-making effectiveness directly or in full operational 
scale, the relevant literature suggests that an adequate generation of relevant 
hypotheses (i.e., what to investigate) and investigative actions (i.e., how to 
investigate) is crucial to the outcome of criminal investigations and reduces 
the risk of cognitive biases (Alison et al., 2013; Ask, 2006; Macquet, 2009 ; 
Nickerson, 1998; Simon, 2012a). The results did not support our prediction 
that a decision to arrest a suspect would act as an investigative tipping-point 
(Study I). That is, contrary to the expectations, the police officers did not 
generate fewer relevant investigative hypotheses and actions in the case 
where an arrest had (vs. had not) been made, and this tendency was not 
moderated by officers’ level of expertise. This finding may accurately reflect 
that strategic decisions, such as making an arrest, exert little influence on 
investigators’ hypotheses generation and testing. On the other hand, at least 
two circumstances in the current experiment may have reduced the chances 
of observing such an effect. First, the manipulation of tipping-points was 
subtle—a single sentence embedded in a larger vignette. Unfortunately, there 
was no manipulation check to verify that participants actually picked up on 
this piece of information, so the salience of the manipulation remains 
unclear. In real-life investigations, such critical decisions are unlikely to go 
unnoticed. Secondly, participants were not involved in making the arrest 
decision, but instead read about a decision already made by a colleague. 
Thus, participants had little or no personal involvement in the decision, and 
they did not experience the transition from pre-decisional deliberation to 
post-decisional implementation. It could be argued, then, that the current 
experiment bore little resemblance to the types of decisions originally 
considered by Gollwitzer et al. (1990) in their definition of decision phases. 
As shown above, participants across all groups favoured hypotheses implying 
a crime (homicide or kidnap) over non-criminal hypotheses such as suicide 
or accident. There was no room for such discrimination in the vignettes. In 
an abductive test of proportional likelihood it is of course crucial to the 
validity of the investigation that all competing explanations are included from 
the outset. In practice disproving all non-criminal alternatives is sometimes 
the only way to warrant a so-called ‘no body–murder’ investigation or a 
murder charge (see e.g., Cook & Tattersall, 2014, p. 368).   
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Study III 
The main aim of Study III was to test the degree to which a test of general 
cognitive abilities, used in the selection process of new police students in 
Norway, predicts the ability to generate investigative hypotheses. A total of 
166 police students took part in the experiment. They were recruited from 
two different locations at the Norwegian Police University College: Oslo (n 
= 88) and Bodoe (n = 78). The same procedure as in Study II was followed. 
Thus, all participants were presented with two vignettes (Case A and B) 
describing cases where a person had gone missing, and which could 
potentially be construed as homicide cases. As in Study II, one of the cases 
included an arrest decision, which served as a manipulation of an 
investigative tipping point. After reading each case, participants were asked 
to identify and write down all necessary and relevant investigative hypotheses 
and actions7. The quality of participants’ responses was assessed using the 
above-mentioned exhaustive gold-standard list of plausible hypotheses. 
Moreover, all participants gave their consent to sharing their results from a 
test of general cognitive ability (Cut-e, 2016) that had been administered 
during the selection procedure for the Police University College. The 
subscales assessing inductive and deductive reasoning were deemed most 
relevant for the hypothesis-generation task and were included in the analyses. 
It was hypothesised that participants’ inductive and deductive reasoning 
scores would be positively correlated with the proportion of generated gold-
standard hypotheses.  
The police students generated on average almost 40 per cent of the 
gold-standard hypotheses in the two cases. Failing to support the predictions, 
a hierarchical multiple regression analysis showed that inductive and 
deductive reasoning scores did not significantly predict the proportion of 
generated gold-standard hypotheses in Case A or Case B. Moreover, 
inductive and deductive reasoning did not moderate the effect of the 
investigative tipping point on the proportion of generated hypotheses in any 
of the cases. A separate 2 (Case: A vs. B) × 2 (tipping-point location: Case A 
vs. Case B) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a large main effect 
of case (ηp2 = .546), indicating that participants generated a substantially 
higher percentage of gold-standard hypotheses in Case A compared with 
Case B. In addition, there was a statistically significant Case × Tipping-Point 																																																								
7 As new police students lack training and procedural knowledge about investigative actions, only hypothesis 
generation was analyzed in Study III. 
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Location interaction, showing that the percentage of generated hypotheses in 
each case depended on whether the tipping point was located in that case or 
not. Considering each case separately, participants tended to generate fewer 
hypotheses in the case when the tipping point was present (vs. absent), 
although the simple effect was not statistically significant for Case A or Case 
B. As in Study II, participants were significantly biased towards hypotheses 
involving a crime (e.g., abduction, murder) as compared non-criminal 
hypotheses (e.g., runaway, accident/illness, suicide). 
 
Discussion. Study III showed that the measures of inductive and deductive 
reasoning ability displayed little or no relationship with police students’ 
ability to generate hypotheses in criminal investigations. The surprisingly low 
correlations may indicate that neither of the measures used here (the Cut-e 
test or the hypotheses-generation task) capture the intended underlying 
constructs (see General Discussion). Another plausible explanation, 
however, is the fact that abductive reasoning skills (part of which were 
addressed by the hypothesis-generation task) are qualitatively different from 
deductive and inductive reasoning. Deductive reasoning applies rules in 
order to work out what happens in specific cases and why it happens. 
Broadly speaking, it is a confirmative exercise (Staat, 1993). Inductive and 
abductive reasoning are more closely related since they both apply 
knowledge and rules to seek new explanations. Inductive reasoning, 
however, is not ideal for exploration since it is restricted to inferences 
generated from previously known information. Abductive reasoning does 
not have the same restriction as it allows for any hypotheses, even pure 
guesswork, as long as it has a potential to add more explanatory power to the 
competing hypotheses (Lipton, 2007). This makes abductive logic inherently 
different from both induction and deduction since it is exploratory, and not 
confirmatory, in nature. The results of Study III strongly suggest that the 
measures of general cognitive ability currently in use in the selection of 
Norwegian police students is not very successful at predicting performance 
on a task crucial to criminal investigation—the generation of investigative 
hypotheses.  
A further finding of Study III was that presence of an investigative 
tipping point was related to the proportion of generated gold-standard 
investigative hypotheses. This result should be interpreted with some 
caution, because although the number of generated hypotheses was lower 
when the tipping-point was present (vs. absent), this comparison was not 
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statistically significant for any of the two cases. One of the cases (Case A) 
appeared to be somewhat more effected by the presence of a tipping point 
than the other (Case B). Possibly, this is because participants produced more 
than 50% of the gold-standard hypotheses in Case A with no tipping-point 
present, which allows for a substantial reduction when the tipping-point is 
introduced; the already low baseline reporting for Case B (just above 30% 
with no tipping point present) may have restricted the amount of further 
reduction (i.e., a floor effect). As in Study II, police students were quite 
strongly biased towards hypotheses implying criminal explanations (e.g., 
murder, kidnapping). In fact, more than one third of the participants did not 
generate any non-criminal hypothesis in any of the cases. In a real-life 
investigation, such complete lack of non-criminal hypotheses would clearly 
hamper the diagnostic process, seriously increase the chance of tunnel-vision 
and guilt-bias (see e.g., Kassin et al., 2003; Marksteiner et al., 2011), and 
reduce the chance of finding a missing person alive. Statistically, runaways, 
accidents, and suicide occur much more often than do murders in Norway 
(e.g., less than one person is murdered for every 25 person reported missing 
(KRIPOS, 2014). Some participants may have understood the task as one 
focused on identifying a main suspect. This perception possibly arose due to 
an understanding among the students that solving a crime (versus solving a 
non-crime) is more socially rewarding within the traditional police culture. 
The typical efficiency goals promoted in the criminal justice process may also 
explain this misperception and the fact that it overrode the explicit 
instructions given to identify all competing explanations. Interestingly, the 
tendency to focus on criminal explanations was found also in Study II using 
the same materials, but among more experienced police officers. This 
indicates that abductive thinking understood as process of progressive 
reasoning towards the best explanation is difficult even under low stress 
conditions and when open-minded thinking is explicitly encouraged. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
The principal aim of this thesis was to explore how detective expertise can be 
defined, achieved, maintained and tested in relation to criminal-investigative 
judgments and decision-making. The investigation of complex crime relies to 
a substantial degree on the individual experience and expertise of the 
detective in charge. The importance of these factors has been largely 
neglected in previous work on investigative psychology. The present research 
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is thus a first step towards a deeper understanding of what is meant by 
professionality and proficiency within criminal investigations and legal fact-
finding across jurisdictions. Drawing on the emerging traditions within 
applied experimental research, predictions were made as to how differences 
in governing policies and detective characteristics might influence the 
performance of one of the most fundamental activities in the criminal justice 
system — criminal investigation. 
 
Knowledge and Awareness 
Study I showed that top detectives from two different jurisdictions in 
Europe acknowledge the relevance of Gollwitzer’s (1990) mind-set theory in 
their professional role. Furthermore, the study identified factors that might 
work as decisional tipping-points in criminal investigations. The two critical 
tipping-points, deciding to make an arrest and deciding on investigative 
strategies, are not atypical or rare decisions in any way—they are daily 
decisions for most detectives. The effects of such pivotal decisions on 
detectives’ decision making can lead to dramatic consequences, given that 
Gollwitzer (1990) theory are transferable to real-life forensic settings. 
Awareness of cognitive biases, as displayed by detectives in Study I, may 
have some protective effect, but this is just a first step towards more 
effective debiasing strategies with in legal fact-finding (Ask, 2006; Tversky & 
Koehler, 1994). 
To the author’s knowledge, Study I was the first to document 
detectives’ beliefs and knowledge about their own operational decision-
making across different legislative systems. Admittedly, the samples surveyed 
were small and may, thus, not be fully representative of the detective 
populations. On the other hand, given the very specialized nature of the 
professional group, it is rare to tap into such large amounts of detective 
experience. Moreover, the strong consensus in the detectives’ responses 
indicates that our findings indeed represent prevalent views within the 
detective community. Our findings further indicate that experienced 
detectives in both England and Norway are aware of many of the risk factors 
and obstacles that might undermine optimal decision-making. Most of the 
situational factors reported as significant correspond well with findings in 
both general and applied decision-making research, such as the role of time 
pressure and excessive workload (Ask & Granhag, 2007b; Bodenhausen, 
1990; Svenson & Maule, 1993), social stereotypes (Devine, 1989; Lindholm, 
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2005), pressure from the public and media (Crego & Alison, 2004; 
Macpherson, 1999), commitment to previous decisions (Gollwitzer, 1990; 
Nickerson, 1998), organizational pressures and team culture (Ask, Granhag, 
et al., 2011; Hofstede, 2001). Moreover, the typical first step in 
professionalizing any job activity is to provide evidence of knowledge within 
the field (Abbot, 1988) and a subsequent step is to document consensus 
between experts within the field (Einhorn, 1974). Hence, Study I can be seen 
as a constructive step towards such a goal, and perhaps even towards 
universally acknowledged professional standards for detectives.   
 
Expertise and Ability 
The high awareness displayed amongst the detectives in Study I is somewhat 
comforting. On the other hand, actively applied countermeasures are 
perhaps even more crucial (Ask & Granhag, 2008). Compared to the rest of 
the world England and Wales have come quite far in the development of 
such applied countermeasures. As described above, the PIP programme was 
a huge investment made after decades of turmoil surrounding the quality of 
criminal investigations. The findings of Study II indicate that the investment 
may have been worthwhile, as the English SIO accredited officers 
dramatically outperformed their Norwegian colleagues with similar length of 
experience.  
To understand why English and Norwegian police officers may have 
benefitted differentially from investigative experience, it is useful to recall the 
differences between the two systems. As a consequence of the PIP 
programme, the English police have a standardized four-step qualification 
system for detectives, comprehensive procedural guidelines, and detailed 
routines for systematic reviews and knowledge sharing. Furthermore, English 
SIOs must undergo annual refreshment training. The SIO development 
programme is very practice oriented and not ‘academic’ in nature (Jones et 
al., 2008; McGrory & Treacy, 2012). Academic terms such as ‘abductive 
reasoning’ are therefore not used directly in the British guidelines or 
accreditation procedures. Nevertheless the materials, routines, and 
recommendations used in the PIP programme (ACPO, 2005, 2006, 2007, 
2010, 2012; Cook & Tattersall, 2014; McGrory & Treacy, 2012) are very 
much in line with the notion of abductive logic (Carson, 2011). The SIOs 
that are recruited and trained are likely to develop an affinity for abductive 
thinking, without the term being explicitly used.  
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By this they might have come closer to a notion pointed out by 
Nickerson (1998), namely: ”The knowledge that people typically consider 
only one hypothesis at a time and often make the assumption at the outset 
that that hypothesis is true leads to the conjecture that reasoning might be 
improved by training people to think of alternative hypotheses early in the 
hypothesis-evaluation process”(p. 211). Moreover, as suggested by Ask 
(2006) might stricter requirements for the documentation of investigative 
judgements and the rationale for the different actions taken provide 
additional safeguards against cognitive biases. The potential success of this 
routine rests on several psychological mechanisms. First, stricter 
requirements for documentation of alternative strategies may urge the 
detective into a deeper and more controlled declarative and structural 
processing (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). As noted by both Glöckner and 
Engel (2013) and Simon (2011), the more shallow coherence-based reasoning 
style, may limit the ‘diagnostic value’ of the available evidence and seriously 
distort the reliability of an investigation. Major crime investigations are 
complex and critical thinking operations (Innes & Brookman, 2013; 
Pennington & Hastie, 1992). Hence, they require a shift to more conscious 
and controlled mind-sets. To be able to do this in high–stake situations, strict 
training and guidance is needed (Graham, 2004; Jones et al., 2008; Weiser et 
al., 2010). The compulsory training, simulations, methods, procedures, 
checklists, and guiding policies provided by the combined effect of the 
ACPO-guidelines, the HOLMES-database and PIP-accreditation regime 
might provide such guidance. Hence, the organisational countermeasures 
against biased decision-making in criminal investigations seem more 
advanced and developed in England than in Norway. Second, the British 
regime of documentation, audit and reviews is likely to increase detectives’ 
perception of accountability. This in turn might motivate detectives to 
pursue crucial accuracy goals in situations where both cognitive and 
operational shortcuts are alluring (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Marksteiner et al., 
2011). Previous research has found accountability to be an effective deterrent 
of numerous cognitive biases (Gaertner, Sedikides, Vevea, & Iuzzini, 2002). 
Lastly, the obligation to document and pursue alternative explanations of the 
event under investigation is firmly documented on page 71 the British ACPO 
Core investigative doctrine:  
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  All material relevant to an investigation should be considered 
and any assumptions or inferences that are made during this 
process should be explicitly recorded. A hypothesis should be a 
reasonable interpretation of the material available and should 
offer the most logical, explanation of the facts, as they are 
known. It is likely, however, that there will be no single most 
logical explanation, but rather a series of hypotheses, each of 
which offers an alternative explanation.  
 
To consider alternative accounts even within the same evidence base has 
been found to decrease people’s confidence in a focal hypothesis (Anderson 
& Sechler, 1986; Edwards & Smith, 1996; Lord et al., 1984). Previous 
research has repeatedly shown that activating knowledge structures, or mind-
set priming, can benefit the information processing also in subsequent and 
new contexts (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). Once activated, a more beneficial 
knowledge structure can typically support interpretations of ambiguous 
information and thereby reduce the potentially negative effects of, for 
example, initial belief perseverance and confirmation bias (O'Brien & 
Oyserman, 2008). Once a concept is primed, other associated concepts are 
also activated. Hence, mind-set priming may also activate and facilitate 
values, norms, or goals that then serve as interpretive frames in the 
processing of subsequent information (Higgins, 1996; Kruglanski, 1996). The 
fact that major British crime detectives were superior to their Norwegian 
counterparts in the Study II might be explained by the fact that they were 
able to apply a more beneficial mind-set. The sum of their PIP level 3 
competencies might have enabled them to generate both deeper and wider 
sets of competing hypotheses than the other participant-groups. Pfeffer and 
Sutton (2013) and Hinds et al. (2003) have documented how bridging the 
knowledge-doing gap has yielded increased performance and safer decisions 
in a number of different branches from nursing to aviation.  
The relatively poor performance among the experienced Norwegian 
practitioners stands in stark contrast to the relatively high levels of 
knowledge and awareness displayed among Norwegian detectives in Study I. 
First of all, the written test used in the study may not necessarily reflect the 
real-life diagnostic abilities of Norwegian and English detectives. Next, the 
British documentation regime might have made English detectives better in 
expressing their ideas. Thus, the decision-making competence might be more 
tacit in Norway that in England. Typically, if you invite a seasoned detective 
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to tell you about his methods he will probably try to convey this by telling a 
story about how he solved one of his cases. His methods and hypotheses are 
elusive  - even to himself. As described by Innes (2003) the detective craft is 
characterised by tacit knowledge as in many other crafts and professions. 
Thus the policy changes in England might have made their operational 
knowledge and competence more explicit. This provides an opportunity to 
discuss, review and develop the practice as well as increasing the possibility 
of researching detectives’ decision-making. The formation of the Journal of 
Homicide and Major Incident Investigation in 2005 may have made British 
detectives become even more conversant in their own practice and more 
effective knowledge sharers. Moreover, although the official measures on 
investigative effectiveness still favour decisional expediency over accuracy, 
the internal regime of documentation, audit and written reviews may have 
motivated English SIOs towards higher degrees of optimisation and 
accuracy. On the other hand, Norwegian detectives without the same drivers 
for maximisation, may be more prone to be what Simon (1955; 1982) called 
‘satisfiers - ready to act as soon as they have enough information to satisfy 
their own requirements (See also Montgomery & Svenson, 1989).  
The lack of relationship between professional experience and 
performance in the Norwegian sample might at first seem surprising. 
However, this is not the first study that fails to demonstrate a beneficial role 
of presumed expertise or of lengthy experience (Rolf, 2004). Alison et al. 
(2013) found that experience alone did not moderate the debilitating 
influence of time pressure on detectives’ decision making in a simulated rape 
investigation. Moreover, Ask and Granhag (2005) found that experienced 
Swedish police investigators were actually less likely than undergraduate 
university students to consider alternative explanations in a staged homicide 
investigation. Likewise, a number of studies on lie detection explored the 
presumed relationship between length of police service and lie detection 
accuracy with no significant findings (Ekman & O'Sullivan, 1991; Porter, 
Woodworth, & Birt, 2000; Vrij & Mann, 2001). In medical settings, some 
studies have found that increased experience is associated with an 
unchanged, or even diminished, clinical ability to perform accurate diagnoses 
among psychotherapists (Dawes, 1996) and physicians (Ericsson et al., 2007). 
Experienced physicians’ ability to diagnose rare diseases was only regained 
after they had undergone a refresher course (Ericsson et al., 2007). While 
expertise often leads to an impressive understanding or ability, it can also 
create illusions of competence and even situational incompetence. This so-
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called ‘curse of expertise’ can prevent highly skilled individuals, teams and 
organisations from thinking ‘out of the box’ both tactically and strategically 
(Hinds, 1999). As concluded by Dror (2011), further scientific studies of 
expertise are crucial to understanding experts’ paradoxical functional 
degradation in certain legal and forensic settings. Hence, to develop actual 
detective expertise, what matters is not only the sheer number of years on 
the job, but also the type of experience gathered on the job. A deliberate 
cultivation of reflectiveness (rather than impulsivity) is what Baron (1985) 
called “actively open-minded thinking”. The superior performance displayed 
by the English SIOs raises the question whether other countries would 
benefit from the introduction of similar programmes and be inspired by what 
is already in place in England and Wales. While this cannot be answered on 
the basis of a single cross-sectional study, our findings point in that direction.  
The relatively good performance displayed by Norwegian novices in 
Study II shows that even police generalists can do rather well on quite 
complex diagnostic tasks. The same has been found in studies of medical 
expertise (Sisson et al., 1991). The high diagnostic performance amongst 
novices may stem from the fact that having just graduated with a Bachelor in 
policing, they possess updated declarative and procedural knowledge 
combined with a strong motivation for optimal performance. Recent 
developments within the police profession, at least in Norway, have 
introduced a growing emphasis on lateral thinking, scientific method and 
intellectually demanding tasks (Larsson, 2010; Weisburd & Neyroud, 2011). 
The modern police service may therefore attract more students with an 
aptitude for abstract reasoning than before. Nevertheless, experienced 
English SIO’s (largely without academic degrees) performed much better 
than did Norwegian police novices with a Bachelor’s degree. This suggests 
that higher education alone does not produce detective expertise, but that it 
might provide a solid foundation.  
 
Aptitude for Detection 
An obvious limitation with any quasi-experimental design like Study II is the 
lack of control over variables that co-vary with the treatment variables of 
interest. This limitation pertains to differences between officers, both at 
different levels of experience and of differing nationality. As for experience, 
it was empirically established that variations in age could not account for the 
observed differences between novices and experts. We cannot overlook, 
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however, that experts and novices differed in terms of other stable 
characteristics related to investigative decision-making ability. One such 
potential individual-difference variable—general cognitive ability—was 
examined in Study III. 
The results of Study III showed that police students’ ability to generate 
investigative hypotheses was not significantly related to their aptitude for 
inductive or deductive reasoning. Moreover, individual-level variables such as 
age, gender, preference for detective work, and level of education were not 
predictive either. This finding was somewhat surprising given that tests that 
purportedly measure general cognitive ability should display a relationship 
with a wide range of cognitive tasks. As mentioned previously however the 
lack of relationship may well reflect the fact that inductive and deductive 
reasoning are distinctly different from the type of reasoning—abduction—
that is required in investigative work. Study III adds to previous research 
failing to demonstrate consistent correlations between cognitive tests of 
individual differences and detectives’ work performance. For example, Ask 
and Granhag (2005) and Rassin (2010) report conflicting evidence regarding 
whether the need for cognitive closure is significantly related to how 
detectives evaluate ambiguous criminal evidence. With regard to the potential 
of cognitive ability tests in the current setting, the findings resonate with 
what has been established in other domains—that IQ is not the same as 
practical thinking skills and is no safeguard against cognitive biases 
(Stanovich & West, 2008).  
According to Stanovich (2009), equally as important as intelligence is 
‘rational thinking mind-ware and procedures’ (p. 38). To the author’s 
knowledge, this has not been tested in applied forensic settings, but 
translated to an investigative setting this means that the detectives’ ability to 
apply a sound contextual understanding and standard operating procedures 
(SOPs) probably is just as important as having a high IQ-score. Study I and 
II showed that although both Norwegian and English detectives seem to 
have a high awareness with respect to their investigative decision-making 
phenomena (Study I), the experiment still yield substantial differences 
between the two expert groups when it comes to their practical integration of 
rational thinking and operational procedures (Study II). In Study III, the 
individual results on the hypothesis-generation task varied from a low 10% 
(one gold-standard hypothesis identified) to a high of 100% (all gold-
standard hypotheses identified) in one of the case scenarios. Moreover, 7% 
of the police students were able to generate more than 65% of the overall 
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gold-standard hypotheses, which is about the same as the average 
performance of highly specialised British SIOs in Study II. Such an 
exceptionally high performance of some beginners lacking formal training 
and experience indicates that it may be worthwhile to identify early 
predictors of core investigative abilities. This line of research is currently in a 
very early stage and much work remains before a stable evidence-base can be 
established.  
 
Is the ‘Effective Detective’ a Myth?  
Interestingly, all the groups in Study II and III, regardless of nationality and 
professional level, showed a clear tendency to ignore non-criminal 
explanations of the cases (e.g., suicide, accident). The majority of the 
participants (almost 90 %) produced less than 50% of the six unique non-
crime hypotheses logically available in the two vignettes. Admittedly, there 
were obvious reasons to suspect murder or abduction in the two cases, but 
that did not imply that any of the competing hypotheses could be ruled out 
from the outset. The information given in the vignettes did not provide 
enough detail to rule out any of the alternatives.  
Why then did the participants tend to disregard the non-crime 
hypotheses? First of all, the police worldwide are rewarded by how quickly 
they can detect and solve crimes, whereas less premium is placed on how 
they deal with non-crime or the prevention of crime (Knutsson, 2013; Tilley, 
2009). This fundamental skewness in the system accounts for the one-
sidedness in police officers’ attention. The inclination for ‘over-
suspiciousness’ amongst police officers is well established in research on 
police culture (see e.g., Maguire, 1994; Packer, 1968; Reiner, 2010). If 
multiple investigative hypotheses have to fight for working memory priority 
(see, eg. McDonald & Hirt, 1997; Montgomery & Svensson, 1989; Waugh & 
Norman, 1965), it is perhaps no surprise that ‘crime’ trumps ‘no-crime’ in the 
minds of police officers. As noted by Brodeur (2010), a heroic act of solving 
a serious crime may seem more socially rewarding to police officers than the 
non-crime alternatives. Similar expectations were found by Winnæss and 
Helland (2014) in a recent study of Norwegian police students, and by 
Corsianos (2003) in a study of seasoned US detectives, with both groups 
favouring ‘high-profile’ cases over volume crime. Further evidence for a 
systematic preference for ‘criminal’ interpretations of ambiguous evidence 
comes from more cognitively oriented psychological research. For example, 
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Dror et al. (2005) found that forensic experts tended to detect matches 
between fingerprints more readily if the crime for which the suspect was 
accused was more (vs. less) severe. Similarly, Ask et al. (2008) found that 
police students had more faith in DNA, video, and identification evidence if 
it produced incriminating (vs. exonerating) information.  
The legal grounds for commencing a criminal investigation is normally 
such that there is a reason to believe that a crime have been committed 
(Stelfox, 2009). Paradoxically, legal terms like ‘strong reason to believe’ 
frequently used in procedural law worldwide to restrict the police from 
abusing investigative actions might in it self ‘dominate’ the information 
search and thereby impede detectives from introducing alternative scenarios 
(See eg., Montgomery & Svenson, 1992). In both vignettes used for Study II 
and III, there was good reason to start an investigation and probably a 
reason to warrant arrests. However, the seemingly strong presence of 
information allowing for a suspicion of a serious crime may have supressed 
the generation of competing explanations which should have been 
considered given the absence of corroborating evidence. For instance, the 
absent information in the vignettes implicitly told participants that the 
persons gone missing had neither been found, identified, nor declared dead. 
This should prompt hypotheses assuming kidnapping and all the non-crime 
alternatives ranging from voluntary runaway to suicide. It is reasonable to 
argue that both present and absent information should be considered equally 
diagnostic.  
The seemingly fundamental human tendency to find the processing of 
negative or disconfirming information difficult was termed by Jenkins and 
Sainsbury (1969) as the feature-positive effect (FPE). The FPE might help 
explain why the non-crime hypotheses were so hard to generate even for 
highly skilled accredited detectives. As mentioned in the introduction, the 
underestimation of the diagnostic value of negative information in legal 
settings was first demonstrated by Wells and Lindsay (1980) who found that 
positive line-up identifications of suspects were considered far more 
informative than non-identifications. Rassin (2011) later demonstrated the 
same effect in an experimental study with 47 experienced judges. Similarly, in 
a study of 188 law students’ willingness to pass a guilty verdict, Eerland and 
Rassin (2012) found a striking asymmetry between the perceived 
diagnosticity of finding versus not finding evidence. Considering that 
deliberate reasoning is limited by cognitive constraints and in complex tasks 
the available information may already fully occupy working memory capacity 
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– simply ignoring conflicting information might psychologically be what to 
expect (Simon, 1957). A consistent trend can be discerned throughout 
society: the volume and complexity of the knowledge that we need to master 
both in our private life and in our professions have grown beyond our 
capacity (Schwartz & Ward, 2004).  
In aviation, this limit was discovered in October 1935, when two of the 
best pilots in the US tragically crashed the brand new Boeing B-17 four 
engine aircraft during a ceremonial test flight (Gawande, 2010). The Boeing 
model was deemed, as a newspaper put it, “too much airplane for one man 
to fly”. Boeing almost went bankrupt and a group of test pilots got together 
and considered what to do. They came up with a checklist for pilots to use 
during training and flight. They had found out that the new plane was much 
better than previous models, but too complicated to be left to the memory of 
any pilot, however expert they were. Later, the B-17 flew a total of 1.8 
million miles without one accident (Gawande, 2010). Perhaps it is time to 
realise that the investigation of complex crimes has entered its ‘B-17 stage’. 
The information load for investigators as well as the volume of information 
available for investigation has risen dramatically over the years (Stelfox, 
2009). This makes it more likely that the judgements and decisions to be 
made are far too numerous and complex to be left to the detective’s working 
memory alone. Hence, expertise alone cannot be trusted to serve as a 
complete safeguard against fundamental cognitive limitations. A new 
paradigm, where the detective in the ‘hot-seat’ is supported by adequate 
knowledge, tested abilities, operational checklists, and evidence based control 
procedures is necessary.  
If the need for a new paradigm is ignored, the potential harmful 
consequences are considerable. First, shallow processing of evidence—an 
inevitable consequence of information overload—may increase the risk of 
stereotyping in criminal investigations. The efficiency-promoting goals that 
characterize the police culture may make detectives favour hypotheses and 
information supporting guilt. Exonerating evidence or information 
supporting a non-criminal explanation may be ignored or go undetected. 
Innocent citizens, unfortunate enough to become the subject of such an 
investigation, may be seriously disadvantaged and wrongfully convicted. Mr. 
Westerlund’s story in the introduction of this thesis is an illustration of how 
damaging this can be not only to the innocent suspect, but also the next-of-
kin, the local society, the reputation of the police, and all other parties 
involved. Second, competing investigative hypotheses and actions that do 
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not receive sufficient attention during an investigation may dramatically 
weaken the prosecution’s case and open up unnecessary and potentially 
exonerating speculations in court. Only the guilty suspect will benefit from 
this.  
It seems that England has come further in developing a new paradigm 
for criminal investigation than has Norway. On the other hand, the 
Norwegian Police University College established a solid Bachelor education 
for all officers and a newly launched Master Study in Criminal Investigation, 
in an attempt to equip future detectives with even better critical-thinking 
skills.  
Limitations  
There are several potential limitations of the studies reported in this thesis. 
First, pertaining to Study I, in-depth interviews about police officers’ 
decision-making awareness cannot compare with observation of how the 
officers apply their awareness in actual investigative settings. The method, 
however, brings several advantages compared with more observational 
methods. The protected communication situation and the use of semi-
structured interview protocols allow reflection, probing, and elaboration on 
topics. The interviews were conducted with extensive use of open-ended 
questions and active listening before engaging in more specific probing 
questions. This is conducive to good knowledge retrieval and minimal 
interference. Hence, the in-depth interview method was chosen as it was 
considered more appropriate than its alternatives for generating rich, 
descriptive data, detailed insights and detectives’ personal reflections on 
investigative decision-making.  
Second, the pen-and-paper vignette study used in Study II and III 
cannot replicate the complexity and scope of real investigations and the 
generalisability of the results is consequently limited. In particular, for ethical 
and practical reasons such studies cannot simulate the potentially high stakes 
involved in a real criminal investigation of, say, a homicide or a kidnapping, 
where victims, public safety and officer careers are potentially at risk. 
However, this applies to any experimental research in this area. In the future 
should more complex and realistic designs be pursued – ideally through the 
development of digital full-scale judgement and decisions simulators.  
Third, an obvious limitation with any quasi-experimental and 
correlational design is the lack of control over variables that co-vary with the 
treatment variables of interest. In the current studies, this pertains to 
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differences between officers both at different levels of experience and of 
differing nationality. As for experience, it was established in Study II that 
variations in age did not account for the observed differences between 
novices and experts. We cannot overlook however, that the participant 
groups differed in terms of other stable factors and these in turn, are related 
to investigative decision-making ability. In real-life research, extensive 
control is hard to achieve, partly due to the limited time-frame available 
when testing busy operational officers relieved from duty by their 
superintendents. Moreover, the potentially confounding variables related to 
national differences are also numerous, and include factors such as crime 
exposure, operational routines, professional status and culture. For instance, 
if senior detectives enjoy a higher social status in England than in Norway, 
then the superior performance of the English experts may be due to a 
stronger motivation to appear as an exceptionally good investigator. 
Moreover, if individuals attracted to the police occupation in England and 
Norway differ in terms of stable personality characteristics, then it may be 
that the two groups naturally grow apart over time due to different rates of 
improvement, independent of differences in training and accreditation (i.e., 
so-called selection–maturation interaction, see; Shadish et al., 2002). 
Motivation and maturation however are unlikely to account for the current 
findings. It is unlikely that any of these factors could predict that experts 
would outperform novices in one country (England) and be slightly worse 
than novices in the other (Norway). Nonetheless, the internal validity of the 
results remains somewhat limited.  
A fourth limitation to the current research findings is that the 
generation and testing of investigative hypotheses represents only one of 
many skills required of a senior detective (ACPO, 2010; Fahsing & 
Gottschalk, 2008; Smith & Flanagan, 2000). The results reported in the thesis 
do not tell us about differences across nations and levels of experience in 
terms of other crucial skills, such as resource management, team leadership, 
and communication skills.  
Fifth, the deductive and inductive subscales of the cognitive ability test 
(Cut-e) used in Study III only allowed for a rather limited operationalisation 
of general cognitive ability. It would have been interesting to examine 
relationships between investigative thinking and available scales testing 
general decision-making skills. For example, the Decision Making Individual 
Differences Inventory (Parker, Bruine de Bruin, & Fischhoff, 2007), the 
Maximization Scale (Schwartz et al., 2002), or more general scales such as the 
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Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal (Watson & Glaser, 2002) may 
provide additional information on individual predictors. On the other hand, 
as shown by Bruine de Bruin et al. (2007), aptness for more complex real life 
decision-making is perhaps best captured through triangulation using 
multidimensional scaling, incorporating several constructs that have been 
proposed from earlier research on diagnostic decision-making, such as need 
for cognition (Ask, Greifeneder, & Reinhard, 2012), need for cognitive 
closure (Ask & Granhag, 2005; Rassin, 2010), creativity (Dean, Fahsing, & 
Gottschalk, 2007), and persistence and perseverance (O'Neill, 2011). As 
noted by Baron (1980), there are many problems in the study of individual 
differences in cognitive processes. For example, recent developments in the 
police profession may have introduced a growing emphasis on intellectually 
demanding tasks (Larsson, 2010; Weisburd & Neyroud, 2011). The modern 
police force may therefore attract more students with an aptitude for abstract 
reasoning than before. The lack of observed relationships between inductive 
and deductive reasoning and the ability to generate investigative hypotheses 
potentially reflects a high average, but lack of variability, in students’ general 
cognitive ability. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The research reported in this thesis might leave an impression that the 
detective’s judgement and decision-making is more prone to error and bias 
than other professional groups. There is, however, no basis for such a claim. 
Instead, one must recognize that criminal investigations are often based on 
inherently uncertain sources of information, which means that conclusions 
beyond reasonable doubt cannot be reached. That is not a defeat for 
detectives, but simply a consequence of how the law is meant to be applied 
in modern democracies. In 2005, Stelfox and Pease described cognition and 
detection as “reluctant bedfellows”, and there is no doubt that the British 
police service has learned that the hard way (Roycroft et al., 2013). A clear 
and unmistakable message from the government was needed before some of 
the available knowledge from social sciences could be applied (Home Office, 
2004).  
Although the reforms in England and Wales seem to have bridged the 
gap between knowledge and expert practice better than Norway, it is 
somewhat surprising that the changes have not been followed up by any 
systematic pre-post research to examine the potential effects of the huge 
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investments and the ‘what-works’ approach. This fact makes the investigative 
landscape much more vulnerable in times of financial recession and cuts in 
government budgets. Moreover, true professions are characterised by a 
constant and documented debate around knowledge and practice (Abbot, 
1988). Within the medical domain Sibbald, de Bruin, and van Merrienboer 
(2013) and Weiser et al. (2010) have shown how use of checklists may 
facilitate good decision-making. Likewise, Rassin (2014) found that raising 
peoples explicit awareness significantly reduced the aforementioned ‘feature-
positive effect’. There are several similar studies on ‘what-works’ from social 
psychology and a number of applied domains, but few, if any, within the 
domain of investigative decision-making. This year (2016), the Norwegian 
Police is launching a big reform to improve the quality of their crime 
investigation on all levels (Politiforum, 2016). So far there are no signs of 
utilisation of the available evidence for research of ‘what-works’ or any 
indications of pre-post research to document the potential effects of the 
upcoming changes. If so, this is another opportunity lost, since such changes 
have a great potential for natural experiments which could serve as both a 
proper evaluation of the reform and also build a much needed evidence-base 
for ‘what-works’ in criminal investigation. A great deal is known about the 
errors human operators make and why they occur (e.g., Elliott, 2005; Fraser-
Mackenzie et al., 2013; Yates, Veinott, & Patalano, 2003). This research has 
been applied to a number of diverse domains, such as the finance industry 
(e.g., Anderson, Lowe, & Reckers, 1993; Holm & Nystedt, 2008; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1986), the aviation industry (e.g., Hutchins, 1995; Sexton, 
Thomas, & Helmreich, 2001; Zsambok & Klein, 1997), the health sector 
(e.g., Arkes et al., 1981; Swets, 1988; Weber et al., 1993), and in military 
command (e.g., Crandall et al., 1992; Freund, Kruglanski, & Schpitzajzen, 
1985; Ross et al., 2002), yielding substantial improvements in recruitment, 
training and operations. To develop similar evidence-based interventions for 
criminal investigation requires organisational effort at a higher level and 
cultural change. Despite the welcoming fact that a high ranking police officer 
is the author of the present thesis, do the executive level of police 
organisations not seem to fully accept, label or mitigate cognitive biases as 
much as they should (Fahsing & Rachlew, 2009; Lieberman et al., 2015; 
Weisburd & Neyroud, 2013). As stated by Cockbain and Knutsson (2015) 
“the true professionalisation of policing is likely to require the expansion and 
amelioration of the police’s internal research capacity”(p.6). The present 
thesis documents a great potential for cross-jurisdictional research and 
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development which in the age of transnational crime and global terror seems 
vital for both tactical, strategic and political reasons (Oleszkiewicz, Granhag, 
& Kleinman, 2014).  
Ultimately, the main contribution from psychology is not how each 
officer should solve each individual case, but rather how the different 
professional actors in the chain of criminal justice should be recruited, 
qualified and organised to best serve the challenging task of fair criminal 
investigation, prosecution, and trial. At present, the best available advice, 
both from an organisational and individual level, is probably to never be too 
conclusive and to stay somewhat in doubt. 
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